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ABSTRACT
!
The objective of this study is to improve our understanding of IT Outsourcing
Governance, which has become an increasingly significant topic in recent years. In order
to gain an understanding of this topic, an extensive literature review was performed and
analyzed with argument mapping. The data yielded from the argument maps was used to
create a comprehensive framework for IT Outsourcing Governance. What resulted was a
new conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance, focused not only on governance
structures and decision rights, but also on relationship management. This
conceptualization not only provides a better understanding, but also presents a sharp
contrast to the traditional view of IT Governance in which relationship management is
not a major factor. In addition to the argument maps, a social representations survey was
performed in order to elicit differences in the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing
Governance between academics and practitioners. The results of the survey were used to
perform a core/periphery analysis, which identified core and peripheral concepts used by
academics and practitioners when discussing IT Outsourcing Governance. The core
topics identified show a high degree of overlap with the dimensions of the framework
previously developed. Finally, a review of existing technologies developed specifically to
manage outsourcing arrangements (Outsourcing Relationship Management Tools) was
performed in order to better understand the alignment between technology and
management practices. This analysis showed that the features of Outsourcing
Relationship Management tools seem to be misaligned with the duties and
responsibilities of people in charge of the day-to-day management of the client-vendor
relationship. The contribution of this research lies in advancing our understanding of IT
!
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Outsourcing Governance by providing a framework and new definition for this concept,
along with a new theoretical lens to understand the evolution of relationships into
partnerships. Additionally, this study augments the tools available to researchers by
introducing argument mapping, a seldom-used technique for discourse analysis that
proved to be very effective for eliciting relevant dimensions related to IT Outsourcing
Governance from a literature review.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Research Motivation And Objectives
The unprecedented growth in outsourcing practices over the past two decades has had a
profound impact on the business world. Organizations that choose to outsource a function
or service often do so because they believe that an external party could provide similar or
even superior levels of service at a lower cost than the company’s internal resources. This
perception is reinforced by economic principles which suggest that external vendors
could achieve better economies of scale, provide more focused expertise, and offer
increased access to a broader, lower-cost labor pool than the average organization would
have. Although this line of reasoning appears to be grounded in good business sense,
results from practice show that business relationships borne of outsourcing decisions
bring with them a new array of thorny problems that have the potential to not only
hamper an organization’s remaining core operations, but also offset the very cost savings
that the organization set out to achieve with its initial outsourcing decision.
When an organization outsources a functional area, it typically does so to reduce
costs and the amount of managerial energy that it expends on this function. It also, by the
very definition of outsourcing, seeks to establish a relational distance between itself and
the outsourced function in order to focus on its core competencies. These objectives,
however, can serve as blinders, which mask the fact that although an outsourcing event
may indeed simplify existing managerial responsibilities, it nevertheless also
simultaneously introduces new, complex relationships between the organization and the
vendor. In fact, these novel relationships demand as much, if not more, managerial effort
than required when functions were performed in-house (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Gewald
!
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& Helbig, 2006). We then must ask: How do organizations ensure that these ancillary
effects don’t cancel out the positive results generated through outsourcing?
The answer to this question is the concept of IT Outsourcing Governance, which
has become increasingly significant in recent years, as organizations have embraced IT
outsourcing and adopted it as a common practice (Dibbern et al., 2004). According to
CIO magazine (Gartner, 2010), governance has ranked among the top 10 concerns of the
surveyed CIOs for the last 5 years. This trend is likely to continue due to the increased
ubiquity of the outsourcing phenomenon and the reduced strategic importance of using
pure cost reduction as a rationale for undertaking an outsourcing initiative.
The complexity of the outsourcing decision should not be underestimated.
Organizations engage in outsourcing because they posit that cost savings will be realized;
otherwise there is no reason to outsource because the organizational complexity
introduced would not otherwise be worth it. What is less understood is how to ensure that
the outsourcing endeavor will create sustainable value to all participating parties –
including the vendor since partnership arrangements have been shown to increase the
likelihood of outsourcing success (Grover et al., 1996; Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Kern &
Willcocks, 2002; Klepper, 1995; Lacity et al., 2009; Levina & Ross, 2003; Natovich,
2003; Willcocks et al., 2007). In this context, understanding the different views and
philosophies for the governance of an outsourcing arrangement is key to developing
management practices that would foster successful, long-term outsourcing relationships.
This understanding, however, remains elusive for both practitioners and academics alike.
This work seeks to fill this void in knowledge by creating a comprehensive
framework for IT Outsourcing Governance using a number of theoretical lenses to
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analyze this phenomenon. IT Outsourcing Governance is an intriguing subject that
encompasses several disciplines, including Information Systems, Management, and
Computer Science, to name a few. Consequently, IT Outsourcing Governance could be
studied from a plethora of philosophical lenses, utilizing multiple methodologies to
gather and to analyze data. As such, IT Outsourcing Governance presents a wealth of
research opportunities within our field. One could focus on studying what type of
governance structures yield the best results; how organizations align cultural differences
when entering an arrangement; what are the best practices to foster a positive relationship
(e.g., shared training sessions); what are the desired personality traits of the personnel
involved in IT Outsourcing Governance; how does IT Outsourcing Governance mesh
with the internal governance structure of an organization, et cetera.
The above-mentioned areas of investigation are just a few directions that research
in IT Outsourcing Governance could take, demonstrating the potential for a rich and
productive research agenda that could include quantitative and qualitative studies,
practitioner-oriented publications, and academic articles. In order to keep this work
manageable, this study focuses on two main areas that would advance our field’s current
understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance. The main objective of this work is to
uncover the nature of IT Outsourcing Governance, while the other area of interest
addresses the technology used by outsourcing practitioners in their efforts to manage the
client-vendor relationship. As companies begin to take a more strategic approach to
outsourcing, wherein the goal of the relationship between parties expands from simple
cost savings to the achievement of the semblance of a business partnership, we can
observe a concomitant increase in both the complexity and criticality of properly
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managing the client-vendor relationship. In this context, the establishment of appropriate
governance structures, combined with the use of adequate management tools, takes on a
fundamental role in the success of the outsourcing endeavor.
By focusing on these two areas – the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing
Governance, and the technology developed to facilitate it – this work establishes a
foundation for future IS-focused research on these topics. In order to gain a better
understanding of these areas, a framework was developed for IT Outsourcing Governance
using conceptualizations from the literature as well as a survey from experts in the IT
Outsourcing Governance field. The framework could be utilized by others as a reference
tool to determine future research agendas, design better tools, develop management
practices, and to have a better overall understanding of what IT Outsourcing Governance
encompasses, and what it means to practitioners and academics alike.
The first research question addressed in this work is: How do academics and
practitioners conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance? As referenced above,
governance has been among the top concerns of CIOs for the past several years. Despite
the obvious importance of the issue to practitioners, the topic of Outsourcing Governance
has been highly under-researched, particularly in the academic literature. Practitioners
have been relying on word-of-mouth and often anecdotal recommendations regarding
best practices, and the concept of IT Outsourcing Governance has not received the
attention from academics that it deserves, given the popularity and widespread adoption
of outsourcing arrangements. The dearth of research in this area, along with the potential
implications for practice (e.g., changes in the role of IT managers, development of best
practices, etc.), that might arise from a better understanding of the core concepts relevant
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to the governance of an outsourcing arrangement, serve as the motivating factors behind
the first research question.
In order to answer this question, a comprehensive framework addressing the
nature of IT Outsourcing Governance was developed based on an exhaustive literature
review of the topic. Then, a social representations survey technique was used to elucidate
the concept of IT Outsourcing Governance held by both consultants and academics. The
results of this survey were compared with the framework in order to obtain a better
understanding of this phenomenon.
With respect to the practical side of IT Outsourcing Governance, new
management tools have been developed to specifically aid in the management of
outsourcing arrangements. These tools collectively are called Outsourcing Relationship
Management (ORM), and provide the necessary scaffolding upon which client and
vendors can ostensibly build successful relationships. Collectively, these tools generally
take the form of software packages that offer monitoring capabilities and analytics tools
that organizations utilize to measure the performance of the outsourcing relationship.
The market currently offers a number of ORM software packages. Among the
most well-known are Janeeva, Enlighta. EquaSiis, and Hiperos. Although these tools
differ in capabilities, they are all built upon the principles of communication
enhancement and real-time information, provide several modes of communications
including RSS feeds, discussion forums, blogs, access to shared documents, etc., and
tools to evaluate the relationship, such as on-demand analytics and reporting, real-time
metrics of performance, and continuous monitoring of the Service Level Agreement
(SLA), to name a few. Despite the many benefits of ORM tools, a study performed in
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partnership with The Cutter Consortium (Hirschheim et al., 2009) showed that
participants have either not heard of these tools, or do not consider them to be worth the
investment.
There might be several plausible explanations for this surprising finding;
however, there are none offered in the literature. This may be because the governance of
an outsourcing relationship is often considered an afterthought in the outsourcing process,
for which there is little or no budget, no dedicated staff, and no consideration given to the
skill set required to effectively manage the client-vendor relationship (Hirschheim et al.,
2009). One possible explanation for these findings is that the feature-set offered by
ORM tools does not align with the desired outcomes of IT Outsourcing Governance,
making their usefulness questionable. This is the key motivator for the second research
question that will be addressed in this work: Do the features of the selected ORM tools
correspond with the dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance identified in the proposed
framework?
In order to answer this question, the feature sets offered by the various ORM tools
included in this study will be matched with the dimensions of IT Outsourcing
Governance identified in the framework previously developed.

Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a survey of relevant
literature on the key concepts regarding IT Outsourcing, IT Governance and IT
Outsourcing Governance. Understanding these concepts is important because they
represent the foundational concepts of this study and will be referenced throughout this
work. Chapter 3 discusses the philosophical underpinnings of the methodologies
!

6!

employed in this work, which will serve to better understand the ontological and
epistemological assumptions underlying this research that provide the necessary lens to
appropriately evaluate the results of this dissertation. Chapter 4 presents the methodology
and data collection techniques used in this work. In Chapter 5, the results of this study are
presented followed by a discussion of the findings in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7
includes a summary of the key contributions of this work, implications for practice, and
future direction of my research.

!
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides an overview of key concepts that will be used throughout this
work. In order to properly understand IT Outsourcing Governance, it is important to
review the literature in IT Outsourcing, the staged process of formally engaging in
outsourcing from the customer’s point of view, the legal structures that outsourcing
arrangements most often utilize, and the role of the CIO in this process. We then turn to a
discussion of IT Governance, and discuss its niche in the field of corporate governance,
and provide the multiple definitions of the term that currently reside in the literature.
Finally, we present a discussion of the scant literature on IT Outsourcing Governance.

Review of IT Outsourcing
The general concept of outsourcing, which is commonly understood as the practice of
making arrangements with an external entity to transfer the provision of goods and
services from within the organization to the external party, has been around for decades
and is utilized across many disciplines (Dibbern et al., 2004). In the IS field, the
outsourcing phenomenon began to gain popularity largely with the 1992 study of the
large outsourcing initiative launched by Kodak (Loh & Venkatraman, 1992). Since then,
the outsourcing phenomenon has been widely studied and subsequently, several
definitions of outsourcing have been developed (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Kern,
1997; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; Lacity et al., 2009; Loh & Venkatraman, 1992).
Although there are many conceptualizations of IT outsourcing, all of the definitions share
a common foundation that can be summarized in the straightforward definition of IT
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outsourcing provided by Lacity and Hirschheim (1993), which defines outsourcing as
“the purchase of a good or service that was previously provided internally.”

Types of Outsourcing Arrangements
The conceptualization of IT outsourcing can be further characterized by the level and
amount of services/goods outsourced, and by the level of ownership maintained within
the organization. Consequently, IT outsourcing can be classified in the following
categories (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; Willcocks et al., 2007):
•

Total Outsourcing: The decision to transfer the equivalent of more than 80% of
the function’s operating budget for assets, leases, staff, and management
responsibility to external providers. This outsourcing option is associated with
problems such as lack of innovation from the supplier, excess fees for services
beyond the contract, fixed prices that exceeded market prices two years into the
contract, et cetera.

•

Total Insourcing: The decision to retain management and provision of more than
80% of the function’s operating budget internally after evaluating the services
market.

•

Selective Outsourcing: This is the most common type of outsourcing, which is
defined as the company’s decision to source selected functions from external
provider(s), while still providing between 20% and 80% of the function’s
operating budget internally.

•

Joint Ventures: The organization and external provider create a new company or
business unit. Deals are typically structured so that the customer provides
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personnel, becomes the venture’s first major customer, and shares in future profits
if the venture attracts external customers.
In addition to the different types of outsourcing arrangements, it is important to
understand the different stages involved in the outsourcing process. The outsourcing
stages provide a roadmap to outsourcing highlighting the different types of decisions that
need to be made from inception to implementation and execution of a sourcing
arrangement.

Outsourcing Stages
The outsourcing process can be divided into five distinct stages that reflect the different
factors that businesses consider in their outsourcing analyses, as well as the decisions that
are typically made when outsourcing (Dibbern et al., 2004). The stages, as depicted in
Figure!1, are:
•

Why: In this stage, the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing are
considered.

•

What: Different alternatives of outsourcing arrangements are analyzed.

•

Which: This stage is based on the decision that the organization makes when
comparing various sourcing options.

•

How: This stage deals with the selection of the vendor, the management of
contracts, and relationships.

•

Outcomes: The analysis of the consequences of the sourcing decision, and the
assessment of success or failure.

!

10!

The five stages of outsourcing can be further classified into two overarching categories
that describe the decision process to outsource, and the implementation of the sourcing
arrangement.

Figure 1 - Outsourcing Stages

This work will focus on!the study of the implementation stage of outsourcing
arrangements (Stages 4 and 5, above) because IT Outsourcing Governance only takes
place after the decision to outsource has been made, a vendor has been selected for the
particular project, and the organization has selected the arrangement of sourcing that is
most convenient and beneficial to them. The next logical step in the process is to decide
how to carry out the outsourcing process. This stage (Stage 4, depicted above) deals
mainly with three actions: vendor selection, contract negotiation (relationship building),
!
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and contract/relationship management. A brief description of each action is provided
below.
Vendor Selection
In the vendor selection stage, an organization may choose from a multitude of
arrangements: one client to one vendor, one client to many vendors, many clients to many
vendors, and many clients to many vendors. A brief description of each type of
relationship follows, using Gallivan and Oh’ definitions (1999):
•

One Client - One Vendor: The client relies on a single vendor to satisfy all of its
outsourcing needs. These types of deals often involve a major vendor that is
equipped with the market power and knowledge expertise to provide a
comprehensive IT solution. An advantage of this type of relationship is the
potential for cost savings as a result of having one vendor providing a large set of
services. On the other hand, having only one vendor may lead to proprietary
solutions that can make the adoption of other products very difficult.

•

One Client - Many Vendors: In this scenario, one client utilizes multiple
vendors to achieve its goals. The division of labor and responsibilities among
vendors is jointly negotiated and understood by all parties. The advantage of this
type of arrangement is the ability to fit every need with a vendor, whose strength
is in the same area, thereby obtaining optimal results. However, these many
vendor deals can be extremely complex and difficult to handle at the contract
level and management level.
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Contract Negotiation
Contract crafting and negotiation has been identified as one of the main factors
determining the success of an outsourcing arrangement (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994;
Hirschheim et al., 2009; Willcocks et al., 2007). During the negotiation stage, the client
and vendor communicate with each other to exchange information about their respective
capabilities, positions and interests. The purpose of a formal contract is to specify task
requirements and obligations of each party in a written form. However, organizations
should strive for flexibility at the contractual level in order to adjust to unforeseen
circumstances not included in the original contract (Goo et al., 2009; Poppo & Zenger,
2002; Willcocks et al., 2007). A company’s procurement department by and large carries
out the crafting of the contract and the evaluation of its execution. There are several types
of contracts that can be used in a sourcing relationship (Willcocks et al., 2007). These
vary based on the level of detail contained by the contracts:
•

Standard Contracts: The customer signs the supplier’s standard, off-the-shelf
contract.

•

Detailed Contracts: The contract includes special contractual clauses for service
scope, service levels, measures of performance, and penalties for not meeting
agreed upon deadlines or objectives.

•

Loose Contracts: The contract does not provide comprehensive performance
measures or contingencies, but specifies that the supplier(s) perform whatever the
customer was doing in the baseline year for the duration of the contract at 10-30%
less than the customer’s budget.
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•

Mixed Contracts: For the first few years of the contract, requirements are fully
specified. However, long-term requirements are not defined in a detailed manner.

According to the findings of Willcocks et al. (2007), detailed contracts facilitated the
achievement of customer expectations with greater frequency than the other types. In
these cases, organizations understood the functions to be outsourced fairly well, and they
could therefore define their precise requirements in a contract. Additionally,
organizations developing detailed contracts spent up to 18 months negotiating the clauses
of the contract. This careful process of negotiation revealed a 75% rate of successful
contracts. The most commonly clauses used in detailed contracts are Costs, Early
Termination, Non-performance Penalty, Confidentiality, Liability, Service Level
Agreement, and Contingency Prices (Willcocks et al., 2007).
Contract Management
A good contract is necessary but not sufficient for a successful IT outsourcing project
(Hirschheim et al., 2009). Since market conditions are bound to change, the contracts
may not include the foresight sufficient to cope with changes. Therefore, a formal
contract, regardless of its length or level of detail, should be complemented by informal
management techniques that provide a level of flexibility that is not found in formal
management. No matter how detailed a contract is, changes in requirements will
inevitably occur in the normal course of business. A formal contract cannot account for
all possible situations that might arise as a consequence of shifts in the global markets,
local policies, or organizational changes. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to
develop an organizational capacity to manage and foster the informal relationship
between the client and vendor. Informal management provides the means for developing
!
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common goals and objectives between the client and vendor, which in turn can lead to an
increase in trust and commitment between parties (Grover et al., 1996).
In summary, for an outsourcing arrangement to be successful, the organization
must maintain clear control processes, effective communication channels and governance
structure with a team of their own individuals who understand the work being done and
the processes being used by the vendor.

Review of IT Governance
In this section, we discuss the evolution of the IT function in corporate settings, the role
of the CIO in managing the ever-changing IT function, and the role of IT Governance in
the organization. The various definitions of IT Governance are presented first, followed
by a discussion about how bestowing the appropriate definition provides the proper
context for discussion the importance of the role of IT Governance. Finally, the most
common structures for IT Governance are treated.
IT Governance is often considered a sub-set of Corporate Governance, which was
developed in response to the growing importance of IT within organizations (Kingsford
et al., 2003). Corporate Governance provides the structure for determining organizational
objectives and for monitoring performance to ensure that those objectives are attained
(OECD, 1999). Although there is no “one size fits all” governance structure, most
companies have adopted a corporate governance model based on a supervisory board that
is responsible for protecting the interests and rights of shareholders and other
stakeholders (customers, employees, creditors, etc.). The board, in turn, works with
senior managers to implement governance principles across the organization (Weill &
Ross, 2008).
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The adoption of IT during the late 50’s and 60’s started a process of
transformation of organizations that is still ongoing (Leavitt & Whistler, 1958). The
research of transformation processes that has occurred during the last five decades
covered the impact of IT in organizations (Drucker, 1988), how to obtain strategic
advantage using IT (Ives & Learmonth, 1984; Porter & Miller, 1985; Weill, 1992), how
to properly manage organizations dependent on IT (Applegate, 1995; Burns & Stalker,
1961), and the future of organizations given the current utilization of technology
(Bieberstein et al., 2005).
At the very core of the organizational transformations experienced since the
1950’s is the evolving role of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), also known as
Information Systems Manager during the late 70’s (Taggart & Silbey, 1979). Since its
inception, the information management function has expanded incredibly from its
original limited conception (supporting accounting activities) to a comprehensive
function that supports the entire organization in a fundamental way. The evolution of the
role of IT within organizations was necessarily accompanied by the evolution of the role
of the CIO (Hirschheim et al., 2003). In 2005, Michael Hammer wrote a seminal CIO
Magazine keynote article that dealt with CIO Evolution (Hammer, 2005). In this article,
the author emphasizes that throughout the last 30 years, the main goals of the CIO have
remained constant, yet now there are other challenges, such as outsourcing that make the
CIO role even more complicated. According to Hammer “To avoid extinction, CIOs must
move from an orientation that revolves around technology to one centered on business
processes.” In this context, the role of IT Governance has gained prominence within the
corporate governance structure due to the fact that it is now recognized that leveraging IT
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successfully to transform the enterprise and create value-added products and services has
become a universal business necessity (ITGI, 2006), and not simply operational support.
According to Ron Rose, CIO at priceline.com Inc. (Hoffman, 2007) “regardless of a
CIO’s roots, he has to almost be a better business person than the business people…”
Therefore, implementing the appropriate governance structures for IT is a major
undertaking the CIO must face.

Defining IT Governance
IT Governance is not an isolated activity, but instead occurs within the context of the
corporate governance of the organization and it is usually the responsibility of the board
of directors and senior executives within the company (ITGI, 2006; Weill & Ross, 2008).
According to the IT Governance Institute, IT Governance consists of the leadership and
organizational structures and processes that ensure that the enterprise’s IT sustains and
extends the enterprise’s strategies and objectives. The purpose of IT Governance is to
direct IT endeavors to ensure that IT’s performance meet the following objectives (ITGI,
2006):
•

Alignment of IT with the enterprise and realization of the promised benefits

•

Use of IT to enable the enterprise by exploiting opportunities and maximizing
benefits

•

Responsible use of IT resources

•

Appropriate management of IT-related risks

This conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance is focused on identifying
objectives that must be achieved through the outsourcing arrangement. However, this
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definition mixes IT Governance with IT Management, which is a frequent mistake (Webb
et al., 2006).
A more straight-forward, yet powerful, definition of IT Governance is provided
by Weill and Ross (2008), which defines the term as a verb rather than a of a noun. For
these authors, IT Governance is defined as “specifying the decision rights and
accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT.” This
succinct conceptualization not only captures the spirit of other definitions (Luffman,
1996; Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Weill & Vitale, 2002), but it also reflects the
inherent complexity of IT Governance by not attempting to define “desirable behavior in
the use of IT.” In the case of the definition put forth by the IT Governance Institute,
“desirable behavior” is a subjective measure that cannot be defined meaningfully in a
way that will fit the needs of every organization. Therefore, the Weill and Ross definition
captures the simple nature of governance – decision rights and accountability – that is
applied specifically to IT.
Weill and Ross’ definition sheds further light on to the nature of IT Governance
by recognizing that governance structures may not match the desired behaviors in the use
of IT that they seek to encourage. In this case, a complementary governance structure
arises to fill the gap between the formal structure implemented by senior executives and
the practices used by workers to achieve their objectives. Therefore, IT Governance can
be understood to have two complementary dimensions: a behavioral dimension that
defines the formal and informal relationships and assigns decision rights to specific
individuals in order to encourage desirable behavior, as well as a normative side that
defines mechanisms for formalizing relationships and providing rules and operating
!
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procedures to ensure that objectives are met. For example, if desirable behavior involves
independent and entrepreneurial business units, senior management will allocate the
decision rights for IT investments to the heads of the business units. In contrast, if
desirable behavior involves an enterprise-wide view of the customer with single point of
contact with the customer, senior management will not allocate decision rights to the
individual business units, deciding instead to implement a more centralized IT investment
government model. Failing to take into account both behavioral and normative sides of IT
Governance can result in a mismatch between desirable behavior and governance
structure, which will create operational inefficiencies due to the fact that the decision
rights will be assigned to people that are not in position to encourage the desirable
behavior that supports business goals.
The Importance of IT Governance
Establishing effective IT Governance can be an onerous task that requires continuous
attention from top executives. However, the growing dependence of modern
organizations on IT seems to indicate that investing time and effort in developing
effective IT Governance is the right decision (ITGI, 2006; Weill & Ross, 2008). While IT
is fundamental to sustain business operations, it is equally essential to grow and innovate
the business in a networked economy that can change market conditions rapidly
(Hammer, 2005; ITGI, 2006).
In addition to the inherent importance of IT within the organization, the case for
effective IT Governance can be made from a purely economic perspective. The average
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IT investment represents approximately 4%1 of an organization’s gross revenue (Webb et
al., 2006). Thus, in order to protect the organization’s investment, IT Governance
becomes more important in a financial sense. As IT becomes more pervasive throughout
the organization, managers and executives must ensure that effective IT Governance is
implemented in order to empower the right people to make the right decisions to
maximize the value that IT brings to the organization.
Structures for IT Governance
Attempting to prescribe a particular IT Governance structure is a very difficult
proposition due to the fact that different organizations will employ different
organizational structures that best fit their needs. There is no “one size fits all” kind of
solution for this problem (Weill & Ross, 2008). However, different archetypes have been
developed in order to offer guidance to practitioners (ITGI, 2006; Sambamurthy & Zmud,
1999, 2000; Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Weill & Ross, 2008). Although these
recommendations are not exhaustive, they do fulfill their purpose of shedding light on to
the intricacies of IT Governance.
The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) provides guidelines for IT Governance
structure without providing a particular archetype or framework. According to ITGI, IT
Governance is the responsibility of the board and executives and it occurs at different
layers or levels within the organization, with team leaders reporting and receiving
direction from their managers, with managers reporting to the executives, and the
executives reporting to the board of directors. The board should be very clear about its
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!IT investment as percentage of revenue varies widely across industries. For more information refer to
http://www.gartner.com/technology/consulting/key_metrics_data.jsp!
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own responsibilities as well as the responsibilities of the executives and management
team, and it should have a system or structure that matches those responsibilities. The
governance process, according to ITGI, starts with setting objectives for the enterprise’s
IT, providing the initial direction, and from then on, a continuous loop is established for
measuring performance, comparing to objectives, and resulting in the redirection of
activities where necessary and a change of objectives where appropriate (ITGI, 2006).
Another practice oriented attempt at defining what the best structures for IT
Governance are is the one carried out by Weill and Ross (2008). The authors identified
five key interrelated IT decisions that are required for effective governance: IT
Principles, IT Architecture, IT Infrastructure, Business Application Needs, and IT
Investment and Prioritization. These decisions can be defined as follows:
•

IT Principles: Clarifying the business role of IT. High-level statements about
how IT is used in the business.

•

IT Architecture: Defining integration and standardization requirements based on
IT Principles.

•

IT Infrastructure: Determining and enabling shared services that provide the
foundation for the enterprise’s IT capability according to the underlying IT
Architecture.

•

Business Application Needs: Specifying the business need for purchased or
internally-developed IT applications enabled by existing IT Infrastructure.

•

IT Investment and Prioritization: Choosing which initiatives to fund and how
much to spend based on the IT Principles, Architecture, Infrastructure and
Application Needs.
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These five key decisions are interrelated, and in fact, must be linked to facilitate effective
governance (Weill & Ross, 2008).
In addition to the five key decisions discussed above, the authors developed six
governance archetypes that describe the typical roles of the personnel who are involved
in making these decisions. These six archetypes are as follows, and are described further
below: Business Monarchy, IT Monarchy, Feudal, Federal, IT Duopoly, and Anarchy.
•

Business Monarchy: In a business monarchy, a group of business executives or
individual executives make IT decisions affecting the entire enterprise. Typically,
business monarchies rely on input for key decisions from many sources, such as
IT leaders from the business units, service-level agreements, reports to the CIO,
etc.

•

IT Monarchy: In an IT monarchy, IT professionals make all IT related decisions.
A typical structure for an IT Monarchy is the formation of an IT Governance
Committee, which consists of senior IT executives that make the strategic
decisions that affect IT.

•

Feudal: In the feudal model, the decision rights are delegated to business unit
leaders, key process owners, or their delegates. This model is uncommon because
it leads to lack of synergy between business units.

•

Federal: These arrangements attempt to balance the responsibilities and
accountabilities of multiple governing bodies, such as country and states. In the
context of IT Governance, C-level executives and business groups may also
include IT executives as additional participants of the governing body. Equivalent
to the central and state governments working together, the biggest, most powerful
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business units often get the most resources, causing dissatisfaction in smaller
business units.
•

IT Duopoly: The IT duopoly is a two-party arrangement in which decisions
represent a bilateral agreement between IT executives and one other group such as
CxOs, business unit leaders or business process owners.

•

Anarchy: Within anarchies, individuals or small groups make their own decisions
based only on their local needs. Anarchies allow for very rapid responsiveness to
local or individual customer needs at the expense of enterprise-wide
standardization.

The IT decisions identified by the authors, coupled with the archetypes developed from
insights from practice, align with the types of decisions that need to be made and who
should make them. However, how these decisions will be made and monitored requires
design and implementation of governance mechanisms such as committees, roles, and
formal processes.
In the academic arena, one of the prominent views on IT Governance structures is
the one provided by Sambamurthy and Zmud (Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999, 2000;
Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Webb et al., 2006). The authors assert that over the last 20
years, three primary modes of IT Governance have emerged as the prevalent structures:
centralized, decentralized, and the federal mode. In the centralized governance mode,
corporate IS has the authority over all three spheres of IT (IT infrastructure management,
IT use management, and project management). With the decentralized governance mode,
the decision-making authority moves from corporate IS departments to divisional IS, and
line management that assumes authority for all IT activities. Lastly, with the federal
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governance mode, both corporate IS and the business units, either the divisional IS or line
management, assumes authority for specific spheres of IT activities.
Based on the work of Sambamurthy and Zmud, Schwarz and Hirschheim used an
extended platform logic model to study IT Governance (Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003).
The results of their research indicate that practitioners have moved past the
centralization-decentralization paradigm to embrace a relationship-based view of
governance. Looking beyond how the organization chart depicts IT governance toward
how IT seeks to create relationships with the business units requires a social view of IT
governance that will increase our understanding on how structures impact an
organization’s underlying working structure (Bate et al., 2000).

Review of IT Outsourcing Governance
In recent years, the significance of IT Outsourcing Governance has taken on heightened
importance. As noted earlier, governance ranks among the top ten concerns of a CIO for
at least last five years (Gartner, 2010). This trend is likely to continue due to the
increased ubiquity of the outsourcing phenomenon and the related reduction in strategic
importance of pure cost-reduction strategies. The continuous growing impact of IT
services on the performance of business processes highlights the need for governance
structures in outsourcing relationships (Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Hirschheim et al.,
2009). Despite the recognized importance of governance structures, there is a surprising
dearth of research articles dealing specifically with the topic of IT Outsourcing
Governance (Meng et al., 2006).
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Defining IT Outsourcing Governance
There aren’t many definitions of IT Outsourcing Governance in the literature. Some
general definitions rely heavily on IT Governance definitions as a foundation to
investigate the client-vendor relationship (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Beulen & Ribbers,
2007; Klepper, 1995). Other authors have provided more specific definitions of IT
Outsourcing Governance as it is the case of Gewald and Helbig (2006). The authors
define IT Outsourcing Governance as the “overarching structure which helps to support
the business objectives of the customer on [the] strategic, functional and operational
level. The governance model defines "what to do", "how to do it", "who should do it" and
"how it should be measured". It addresses the rules, processes, metrics and
organizational structures needed for effective planning, decision making, steering and
control of the outsourcing engagement in order to mitigate the risk inherent in any
outsourcing relationship” (pp. 3-4). According to the authors, IT Outsourcing
Governance provides a framework to steer and control the outsourcing engagement in a
way based on partnership and mutual trust with relationship management as an integral
part of the governance model.
Another definition in the form of a framework establishes IT Outsourcing
Governance as a model that consists of three core dimensions: the outsourcing
governance process, outsourcing organizational structure and performance measurement
(Meng et al., 2006). The outsourcing process defines the steps to follow for key
outsourcing decisions, the outsourcing organizational structure clarifies the roles and
their accountabilities in the outsourcing arrangement, and finally, the outsourcing
performance measurement focuses on monitoring the performance of the outsourcing
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relationship. From the three dimensions specified, it is clear that the only one that deals
solely with IT Outsourcing Governance is the organizational structure dimension. In this
context, the authors provide an organizational structure reference model that highlights
the central point of what they consider an ideal governance structure. At the client side,
the authors propose the creation of an Outsourcing Office responsible for establishing the
outsourcing strategy, processes and standards while the vendor counterpart is the
Program Management Office. The authors recommend several layers of equivalent
positions between client and vendor in order guarantee horizontal communication at all
levels across organizations.
A more succinct definition of IT Outsourcing governance is provided by the IT
Governance Institute, that defines IT Outsourcing Governance (Simmons, 2005) as the
“set of responsibilities, roles, objectives, interfaces and controls required to anticipate
change and manage the introduction, maintenance, performance, costs and control of
third-party- provided services” (p. 7). Inherent in this definition is the notion that IT
Outsourcing Governance is an active, constantly evolving process that client and vendors
must adopt to provide a common and effective approach to control and manage
exchanges among all stakeholders from both parties. As the authors state, “As a strategic
resource, outsourcing must be governed accordingly. This is not just about purchasing
but about effective management and ensuring that both parties benefit” (p. 7).
Understanding the different views and core concepts relevant to the governance of
an outsourcing arrangement is key to generating management practices that would foster
successful outsourcing relationships. This understanding, however, remains elusive for
both practitioners and academics alike. This work seeks to fill this void in knowledge by
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creating a comprehensive framework that will contribute to our understanding of what IT
Outsourcing Governance entails.

!
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CHAPTER 3: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS
!

It is only through the understanding of ontological and epistemological assumptions
underlying research methodology that we can truly evaluate the results of any research
endeavor. Any pursuit of knowledge is always faced with what are often referred to as the
“essential problem in science.” That is, how do we know what we know, and how do we
acquire knowledge? (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000). Thus, before proceeding to the
description of the methodological approaches used and the discussion of the results
obtained in this research, it is important to clarify the philosophical underpinnings of the
methodologies used in this work, especially when working within a pluralistic field that
contains a plethora of philosophical approaches (Benbasat & Weber, 1996). First, a
discussion of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action provides the ontological and
epistemological foundation for this study. Then, a description of Toulmin’s informal
logic is provided in order to establish the basic philosophy behind the argument mapping
methodology used in this work. Finally, an introduction to Social Representations theory
is provided to familiarize the reader with this important theory that is used in the
methodology section to gain better understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance through
a social representations survey of experts in the field.

Theory of Communicative Action
Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984a, b) addresses the central
quandary of what it means to be reasonable, and by expanding the parameters of
reasonable discourse with respect to a given proposition’s realm of concern. According
to Habermas, the depiction of rationality as “the most efficient means to important ends”
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(Abrahamson, 1996) or as “goal-rational” behavior is an unnecessarily limited portrayal
of reason derived from the restrictive influence of the philosophy of consciousness. The
philosophy of consciousness conceives of subjective reason as regulating two relations
which the subject can have to an object, namely that of cognition, in which the object is
allegedly represented as it is, and that of action, in which it is produced as it should be
(Brand, 1990). Habermas, however, criticizes this philosophical underpinning as being
too narrow, because by exclusively focusing on subject-object relationships it becomes
blind to intersubjective or subject-subject relations, which provides meaning and context
to the subject-object relationship. Unlike in subject-object activities where rationality can
be depicted as an individual subject’s cognition and manipulation of an object, in subjectsubject relations – what he terms ‘social action’ - the locus of rationality can be found in
the shared understanding that gives meaning to these acts of cognition and manipulation
of objects. Reason, according to Habermas, is not to be found in a single subject but in
the relations of subjects. Habermas consequently depicts reason or rationality as a
“communicative rationality.”
The central intuition underpinning Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality is the
notion that the fact that humans can use language is evidence of an innate capacity for
reason. As he writes in one of his early treatments of the subject (Habermas, 1970), “With
the first sentence used the intention to reach a general and uncompelled consensus is
pronounced unmistakably” (p. 163). The key issue in human communication is “how is
understanding (among speaking and acting subjects) possible in general?” (McCarthy,
1982).
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In the context of an organization’s decision to implement an outsourcing arrangement,
this question would take the form of how individuals who begin at mutually unknown
and substantially different starting points regarding the particular strategy arrive at
converging interpretations that allow them to achieve consensus on coordinating their
future actions. The basic vehicle for this coordination process is language (or equivalent
extra-verbal expressions such as body gestures). Communicative rationality consequently
is the common enterprise of achieving consensus in a situation in which all participants
are free to have their say and have equal chances to express their views – a situation that
Habermas describes as the “ideal speech situation”.
According to Habermas (1984b) social action can be divided into two
orientations: an orientation to succeed (instrumental action when this orientation is
related to objects and strategic action when it is related to subjects) and an orientation to
reach an understanding (communicative action). Instrumental and strategic actions
consequently can be assessed along a singular dimension of rationality. Instrumental
actions can be evaluated by measuring the efficiency with which objects are manipulated
to achieve particular goals while strategic actions can be “appraised from the standpoint
of the efficiency of influencing the decisions of rational opponents” (McCarthy, 1982).
In communicative action however the goal is the achievement of understanding where “to
reach understanding means here that the partners in interaction set out, and manage to
convince, each other, so that their action is coordinated on the basis of motivation
through reason” (Brand, 1990). The coordination mechanism of communicative action
differs from that of strategic action in that the latter is based on egocentric calculations
and is coordinated on the basis of a communion of interests (as is exampled in market
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economies) whereas the former is based on the pure force of the better argument. Not that
communicative action nullifies individualistic motivations, but in communicative action
these ends are subjugated to the use of language in a manner that is oriented towards
achieving understanding. The essential difference is that in strategic action, ego
influences the choice decisions not through criticizable claims couched in language but
by sanctions, or gratifications, force or money. In communicative action (Habermas,
1984b), agreement “cannot be imposed by either party, whether instrumentally through
intervention in the situation directly or strategically though influencing the decisions of
opponents… what comes to pass manifestly through outside influence… cannot count
subjectively as agreement. Agreement rests on common convictions” (p. 287).
Habermas consequently addresses a central quandary of the outsourcing governance
literature when he places the locus of reason or rationality in the act of communication
itself and not a predefined outcome or goal. By introducing the concept of
communicative rationality, which is geared towards the development of normative
understanding and agreement, Habermas allows for the existence of reasonable discourse
even in amorphous or uncontrolled settings. Indeed, according to Habermas, the less
controlled the setting the more rational or reasonable the discourse is likely to be. This
unconstrained setting is what Habermas terms as the “ideal speech situation.” The ideal
speech situation is a hypothetical situation which is characterized by: (a) an open agenda
and free access in which all claims and counterclaims can be freely examined; (b) no
asymmetries of knowledge or power (a community of peers) so that all have an equal
chance to be heard and no one can be intimidated; and (c) a social atmosphere that
encourages everyone to express their feelings, to question and examine those feelings so
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as to minimize the chances of self-delusion and insincerity (people saying things that they
do not really mean) (Klein & Hirschheim, 1991). While this “ideal” is never actually
realized in everyday communication, it does provide a lens by which rational discourse
could be examined because the closer the communication is to the ideal type the more
rational it could be deemed to be and vice-versa.
The second contribution of Habermas’ theory is based on his proposition that how
claims are determined to be valid or reasonable varies depending on three ontological
relations of actors and the corresponding concepts of the objective, social and subjective
world (O'Donnell & Henriksen, 2002). According to Habermas, claims of fact, truth or
efficacy are reasonably made with regard to objective/physical phenomena. In this realm,
claims can be verified by multiple observers using procedures that render social values
and individual idiosyncrasies irrelevant. Claims pertinent to social phenomena however
are only verifiable by testing the level of agreement or conflict that the claims have with
principles that govern relations between, and the rights of individuals within a society.
The validation process in this realm is not irrational, but presupposes an open forum for
discussion that is free from coercion or control. Rational discourse in this sphere of
reasoning addresses questions such as what is good or bad, or right and wrong in an
organization and is well suited to make recommendations about what courses of action
should or should not be taken (Klein & Hirschheim, 2001). The subjective world deals
with claims of sincerity or authenticity which refer to each person’s inner experiences to
which he or she has privileged access (Brand, 1990). In this context, an individual may
challenge the validity of a claim because he/she holds doubts regarding the intentions or
sincerity of the speaker.
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Toulmin’s Informal Logic
Informal logic attempts to identify general criteria for good reasoning, and defines
positive argument schema that specify particular forms of good reasoning. According to
Toulmin (1958), “logic is concerned with the soundness of the claims we make – with the
solidity of the grounds we produce to support them, the firmness of the backing we
provide for them” (p. 7).
In his book The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin proposed that a valid
argument has a proper form, analogous to a legal argument that can be laid out for
inspection. Toulmin further proposed that the question “How does our cognitive
equipment function?” is philosophically equivalent to the question, “What sorts of
arguments could be produced for the things we claim to know?” (Toulmin, 1958). In this
context, the study of arguments is of special importance to decision makers, due to the
fact that they spend most of their time and resources trying to elucidate and communicate
which claims are credible, plausible, and possible. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
observed, “The domain of argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible, the
probable, to the degree that the latter eludes the certainty of calculations” (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Toulmin provides a formal method to analyze arguments and
thus, determine their credibility, plausibility and possibility. In Toulmin’s words “A
sound argument, a well-grounded or firmly-backed claim, is one which will stand up to
criticism, one for which a case can be presented coming up to the standard required if it
is to deserve a favorable verdict” (p. 8). The focus of Toulmin’s logic is in “justificatory
arguments” brought forward in support of assertions, in the structures they may be
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expected to have, the merits they can claim, and the ways in which we set about grading,
assessing and criticizing them.

The Layout of Arguments
One of the main strengths of the mathematical approach to logic is the idea of providing a
clear form to a valid argument wherein the use of axioms, mathematics and geometry
hypothesis can be tested, conclusions derived and consensus reached. If one thinks of
logic in the context of sociology or psychology, the notion of logical form becomes
elusive, making it difficult to assess the validity of claims.

Figure'2')'Layout'of'Arguments'
However, by analyzing the types of arguments used in different disciplines, one can
observe that arguments dealing with physical impossibilities, linguistic solecisms, legal
or moral offenses, improprieties of judicial procedures, conceptual incongruities or
mathematical impossibilities all share a common pattern that can be used to elucidate
what is the proper form or structure of an argument. According to Toulmin (1958), the
main components of an argument are Grounds (or data), Warrants, Qualifiers, Rebuttals
and Claims. The interrelationships between these concepts are depicted in Figure 2, and
they form the skeleton or scaffold that describes the layout of arguments.
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Supposing that in the course of a discussion, an assertion is made, and the speaker
commits to the validity of the claim inherently associated with this assertion, the speaker
will be forced to present grounds that will serve as the foundation upon which the claim
is based. The proposed layout for the structure of arguments is elusive, making it difficult
to assess the validity of claim. Figure 2 depicts the process by which facts can be used to
logically support a particular claim. What follows is a description of the relationships
between the different components of the argument layout.
The most obvious distinction that we have described already is the one between a
Claim, whose merits we are seeking to establish, and the Grounds or data we use as
foundation for the Claim. Producing facts (Grounds) as a response to a challenge of our
claim may serve to satisfy any doubts regarding the validity of the Claim. However, even
after the Grounds for a Claim have been provided, a different kind of question can be
asked. Instead of asking what kind of evidence exists to support a claim, the challenger
could ask, based on the existence evidence: How can one arrive at the proposed
conclusion? This logical step connecting Grounds with Claims is filled by the
introduction of Warrants. These propositions are incidental and explanatory, allowing for
the logical jump between the claim and its grounds. Warrants can further be classified in
the following categories:
•

Substantive: refer the listener to facts or logic that the speaker assumes
will be accepted without further argument

•

Authoritative: are often left to the audience’s inference relying on the
speaker’s perceived authority

•
!

Motivational: appeal to the listener’s values
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Since Warrants can be of different types, they consequently confer different degrees of
force on the conclusions (Claims) they justify. Some Warrants, given the appropriate
Grounds, allow for the unequivocal acceptance of a Claim; others only provide enough
support for the Claim under particular conditions, exceptions or qualifications. Therefore,
it isn’t enough to simply specify Grounds and Warrants in support of a Claim. There is a
need for a Qualifier that can provide an explicit reference to the degree of force that the
data confer on the claim in virtue of the warrant. Similar to Qualifiers, Rebuttals express
conditions of exception indicating the circumstances in which the general authority of the
Warrant would have to be set aside.

Figure 3 - Example of Argument Layout

In order to illustrate the interaction of all components of an argument, let us
consider the Claim that Harry is a British subject. This Claim can normally be defended
by pointing to the fact that Harry was born in Bermuda. However, the place of birth by
itself is not sufficient evidence (Grounds) to support the Claim in the absence of other
considerations such as nationality of his parents, or Harry changing his nationality since
birth. A graphical depiction of this example is provided in Figure!3.
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Although Toulmin maintains that the layout of arguments he proposes applies to
all disciplines, it is important to highlight that according to Toulmin, the validity of a
claim is an intra-field, not an inter-field notion (Toulmin, 1958). According to Toulmin,
“Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field when the data and conclusions in
each of the two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type: they will be said to
come from different fields when the backing of the conclusions in each of the two
arguments are not of the same logical type” (p. 14). Arguments within any field can be
judged by standards appropriate within that field and that the merits to be demanded of an
argument in one field will be found to be absent from entirely meritorious arguments in
another. In the words of Toulmin (1958), “whether an argument is put forward in
support of a bare assertion, or a claim to knowledge, in either case its adequacy will be a
logical question: the fact that in the second case the assertion is made under cover of a
claim to authority and reliability (‘I know that…’) makes no serious difference to the
standards for judging the argument in its support” (p. 246).

Social Representations Theory
Social Representations Theory (SRT) was first introduced by the French social
psychologist Serge Moscovici in the 1960s. According to Farr (1984), social
representations should be seen as a specific way of understanding and communicating
what we know already. They are connectors between image and meaning. In society,
there is a continual need to reconstitute "common sense" that makes sense of images and
meaning. Thus, social representations are a cognitive system at the social level that
enables the organization and interpretation of reality (Nicolini, 1999). Moscovici based
his theory of social representations on the notion of Durkheim’s collective
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representations. For Durkheim (1898), collective representations were used to describe
shared understanding or thought by individuals within a society that encompass general
categories that include elements such as science, ideology and worldviews. According to
Durkheim’s view of collective representations, the understanding shared by individuals
refers to a form of knowledge that is produced by a single source of authority, that is
strongly resistant to change and that functions to bind societies together. It is on this point
that Moscovici’s social representations diverge from Durkheim’s conceptualization.
Moscovici (1988) makes clear that “It seems to be an aberration, in any case, to
consider representations as homogeneous and shared as such by a whole society. What
we wished to emphasize by giving up the word collective was this plurality of
representations and their diversity within a group” (p. 219). In other words, social
representations help us make sense of our world and to interact within it with other
members of society. In this context, Moscovici defined social representations as “a
system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order
which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world
and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the
members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code
for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their
individual and group history” (p. 214).
One way of representing the dynamics through which people confer meaning to
situations with others is given by the semiotic triangle representing the interactions taking
place between a person, others and an object of discourse (Moscovici, 1984) as depicted
in Figure 4.!
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Figure 4 - Semiotic Triangle for Social Representations
According to Moscovici (1984), “ social representations should be seen as a specific way
of understanding and communicating what we know already. They are connectors
between image and meaning. In society there is a continual need to reconstitute "common
sense" that makes sense of images and meaning” (p. 17). In this context, we can think of
social representations as dynamic structures continuously changing through the
interactions of individuals within societies (Jung et al., 2009).

Anchoring and Objectification
Since Social Representations Theory (SRT) focuses on the organization and structuring
of common sense knowledge, it is important to understand how these processes occur. In
SRT, the structuring and organization of knowledge happens through Anchoring and
Objectification, which are the processes that help individuals to form, maintain and
change representations. Studying Anchoring and Objectification elucidates the socially
shared interpretive system that influences social actors’ thoughts and actions (Philogene
& Deaux, 2001). Marková provides an example of Anchoring and Objectification, when
she describes the anchoring and objectification process for the concept of democracy in
totalitarian regimes (Marková, 2000). During totalitarianism, the idea of democracy
might be anchored in common thinking to freedom, justice and equality. When
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totalitarian regimes are replaced by democratic systems, people form representations of
democracy by creating themes of oppositional categories like freedom/oppression,
justice/injustice, and equality/inequality. As they newly experience instances of injustice,
oppression, non-equality, in their daily life, they objectify the idea of democracy, fix it
and concretize it in new conditions. An example that highlights the evolution of the
concept of democracy is suffrage, or the right to vote, for women. For instance, in the
United States, the right to vote for a woman was not originally seen as a key component
of democracy. However, as society evolved, the perceived inequality between men and
women became evident, and thus it affected the core concept of democracy. It is now
well understood that in a free society, all citizens, regardless of their race or gender,
possess equal rights.
Anchoring takes place when individuals are faced with new and unfamiliar
phenomena. It is during the anchoring process that unfamiliar objects are classified and
named by comparing them with familiar categories (Moscovici, 1984). Anchoring is a
dynamic process that involves the comparison, evaluation and integration of new and
unfamiliar phenomena into existing knowledge. According to Molinari and Emiliani
(Molinari & Emiliani, 1996), the process of anchoring accounts for the integration of
knowledge in terms of classification and denomination within well-known categories, the
allocation of meaning to all the elements of a representation (both central and peripheral),
and the instrumentality of knowledge. The process of anchoring can be further classified
in three categories, Psychological Anchoring, Sociological Anchoring, and Psychosocial
Anchoring (Doise, 1992). Psychological Anchoring is described as the link between the
opinions expressed towards actual practices and the more general knowledge of the same

!

40!

topic; for example, how much a mother feels she can influence the intellectual
development of her child and what she thinks in general about cognitive development.
Sociological Anchoring is at work when knowledge or representations are molded by the
social insertions of groups of subjects such as being a housewife, an office worker, or a
teacher. Psychosocial anchoring takes into account sociocognitive functioning and social
dynamics. In this case, social representations are regulated by the identity dynamics due
to the assumption of multiple social roles (as, for example, being at the same time a
mother and a teacher).
Every process of anchoring also involves objectification, formation of new
meaning of the phenomenon in question. While anchoring is a dynamic process that relies
primarily on the individual’s experience and memory in classifying and naming newly
understood and newly experienced phenomena, objectification, on the other hand, is
primarily a sense-making activity in which the individual, on the basis of his or her
interpretation of events in the outside world, reconstructs the existing contents of
representations, creates new ones, and gives meanings to these new contents (Marková,
2000). Moscovici associates the concept of objectification with fixation or concretization
of an idea: what originally was perceived becomes conceived (Moscovici, 1984). For
example, many religions endow the abstract idea of God with concrete meaning by using
an analogy of God as “father,” which provides devotes with more real and tangible
experience (Byford, 2002). Anchoring and objectification are key to social
representations since they contribute to emergence, reproduction, and transformation of
social representations over time (Orfali, 2002).
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Structure of Social Representations
Social representations, through the processes of anchoring and objectification, develop a
conceptual network or structure that describes the common sense knowledge acquired by
the individuals within society. A popular representation of the structure of social
representations is provided by the concept of core/periphery (Abric, 1993). Abric
proposes that social representations are internally organized into two systems, a central
system or core, and a periphery system. The central system, or core, is composed of one
or a small number of cognitive elements that are responsible for the stability, rigidity and
consensuality of the representation. These elements are closely tied to the collective
memory and to the history of a social group, resistant to change and least sensitive to
variable social contexts. The central core, or attitudinal component, provides a generating
function through which the other elements acquire meaning and value (Abric, 2001). The
peripheral system is organized around the central core, and it is composed by all the
elements of the representation which allow for mobility, flexibility and inter-individual
differences (Abric, 2001). Thus, it provides the integration of individual experiences and
histories, and supports the evolution, contradictions and heterogeneity of a particular
social group. Since the periphery elements are by definition more sensitive to changes in
context, they work as an isolation system for the central core, protecting it from
circumstantial transformations in social practices (Flament, 1994). The core/periphery
model is used to analyze social representations and identify the core concepts of a
particular phenomenon of interest. In this work, Social Representations are used to
determine the core and peripheral concepts that represent the IS community’s shared
understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA
COLLECTION
This chapter describes the research methods as well as the data collection methodology
employed in this work. The main two research methods used in this dissertation are
argument mapping, which is based on Toulmin’s uses of arguments and social
representations, as described in the previous chapter. Both methodologies fit within the
qualitative paradigm, although data collected through social representation is analyzed
with a quantitative technique, i.e., measure of coreness, which will be described in depth
in subsequent sections. In addition, a survey of companies engaged in outsourcing
arrangements was performed in collaboration with the Cutter Consortium to better
understand client-vendor relationships and the usage of Outsourcing Management Tools.
This chapter is organized as follows: First, a discussion of the methodological
approach to this work is presented along with the concept of triangulation in the context
of qualitative research. Second, Argument Mapping is described, followed by a
discussion of the data collection, and data analysis processes for this methodology. Third,
data collection and data analysis for Social Representations is covered. Finally, a
description of the data collection process for the analysis of ORM tools is presented along
with the details of the client-vendor survey performed with the Cutter Consortium.

Methodological Approach
Qualitative research can be performed through a multiplicity of perspectives and
methodologies that help the researcher study things in their natural settings as they
attempt to make sense or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to
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them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Given the multiple methodologies and perspectives that
can be used to do qualitative research, it is difficult to define. According to Mason
(Mason, 2002), all qualitative research shares three main characteristics:
•

Grounded in a philosophical perspective that it is mainly interpretivist in the sense
that it is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, produced
or constituted;

•

Based on methods of data collection, which are both flexible and sensitive to the
social context in which the data are produced; and

•

Based on methods of analysis, explanation and argument building, which involve
understandings of complexity, detail and context.

As noted above, this work relies upon multiple methods to gain a better
understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance. The underlying motivation comes from the
concept of triangulation of data, which implies the use of multiple methods in order to
gain a better understanding of the phenomenon in question (Mason, 2002). Positivistic
studies undertake triangulation to validate or quantify the phenomenon in question. In the
quantitative tradition, triangulation is used to determine validity (convergent and
discriminant) and conflicting results are problematic. In qualitative research, conflicting
results do not subtract validity, but instead add insights to our understanding of the
phenomenon under investigation. According to the interpretivist philosophy upon which
qualitative research is based, objective reality can never be captured; instead, we only
know a thing through its representations. Thus, researchers often rely on triangulation as
an alternative to validation, not as a tool or strategy of validation (Flick, 2002).
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The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials,
perspectives and observers in a single study is best understood, then, as a strategy that
adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to inquiry. Richardson and Adams
St. Pierre (2005) claim that instead of the concept of triangulation, qualitative inquiry is
best represented by a crystal. A crystal is multifaceted, it reflects externalities, but it also
refracts within itself, creating in this way unique views of the world. The multiple
methodological approach is applied in this work through the use of three techniques:
Argument Mapping, Social Representations (core/periphery analysis), and the clientvendor relationship survey that was performed in collaboration with the Cutter
Consortium. These methodologies are discussed in the following sections.

Argument Mapping
As previously described in Chapter 3, Toulmin identified the different components of
arguments used by people who assert something they want others to believe. Fletcher and
Huff (1990) built on this theory to develop Argument Mapping, a diagrammatic form that
illustrates the interrelationship among components of arguments, which can be used to
graphically analyze the merits of an argument. Argument Mapping is a technique based
on the theory of informal logic that treats arguments as rhetorical acts intended to
persuade others (Pawlowski et al., 2008). This method involves dividing documents into
topic blocks, subdividing the blocks into discrete arguments, and then identifying the
components of each argument. The resulting structures of arguments can be graphically
depicted in a way that summarizes the major points made by the author.
Argument mapping was selected as a primary methodology for two reasons:
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1. Argument Mapping provides a logically consistent methodology to analyze
discourse through the lens of Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which
allows us to critically examine the structure of this discourse. Habermas’ theory
of communicative action provides the philosophical foundation for this work.
2. Argument Mapping fits with the type of informal logic and practical reasoning
typically involved in the group discourse and decision making surrounding the
implementation of outsourcing arrangements in an organization.
In order to properly develop argument maps, the different components of an argument
must be identified in order to understand the validity2 of the argument. A brief
description of each component of an argument is provided below.

Components of an Argument
•

Key Claims: According to Toulmin, the claim is “the explicit appeal produced by
the argument, and is always of a potential controversial nature.” In other words, a
claim is a statement advanced for others to believe (Fletcher & Huff, 1990).

•

Grounds: Are evidence produced in support of a claim and are given in answer to
the question, “What do you have to go on? The general format is: “Given these
GROUNDS, I assert that this CLAIM is true.” It is important to highlight that
grounds are identified on the basis of their primary function within the context of
the argument since the validity of a ground is context dependent.

•

Warrants: These show the logical connection between claim and grounds.
Warrants answer the question: How did you get from these grounds to that claim?

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!According to Toulmin, an argument is valid if it is properly formed.
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(Toulmin, 1958). Warrants present the problems that are often implicit in the
argument, in which case the coder must infer the warrant that connects grounds
with a particular claim (Fletcher & Huff, 1990).
•

Qualifiers: Are used to communicate the degree to which we are to accept the
claim as true. Qualifiers may reflect genuine doubts on the part of the speaker
regarding a particular claim.

•

Rebuttals: These statements manage potential objections by stating conditions
under which the claim might hold or not hold.

Argument mapping thus provides a formal method to deconstruct an argument for further
analysis and inspection that serves as the foundation for discourse analysis of existing
literature in the IT Outsourcing Governance area. As it is the case with all discourse
analysis tools, the results of the application of Argument Mapping will only be relevant if
the data collection and data analysis processes are exhaustive and rigorous. The following
sections describe the procedures of data collection and analysis performed in this work.

Data Collection for Argument Mapping
In order to capture the different views and practices in outsourcing governance, a
comprehensive literature review was undertaken covering 30+ sources, including
academic journals from several disciplines (Information Systems, Management, Applied
Management), academic and practitioner conference papers, trade publications, and
practitioner journals. Although practitioner’s outlets were including in the literature pool,
the focus of the study is the understanding of IT Outsourcing Governance in the academic
community. Practitioner’s reports were used solely to determine if they contributed any
new claims, or grounds to the discourse. The practitioner literature reviewed in this work
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did not produce new claims or inconsistent results when compared with the results found
in the academic literature review. The full list of journals is available in Table!1. To
ensure that the literature review was as exhaustive as possible, while keeping it
manageable, a broad search was conducted using a set of keywords as the only delimiters
of the search. The keywords used as the root were: “Outsourcing Governance,”
“Outsourcing Relationship Management,” and “IT Governance.” Once all articles from
the different sources were compiled, a filtering process began in which the articles were
reviewed for relevant content. An analysis of abstracts worked as the first filter, with a
more thorough review of articles as a second filter. The filtering process produced 73
articles that were deemed relevant and used for the creation of argument maps.

Table 1 - List of Journals
Academic Journals
IS Journals

Management Journals

Information & Organization
Academy of Management Journal (AMJ)
Communications of the Association for Computing
Machinery (CACM)
European Journal of Information Systems (EJIS)

Academy of Management Review (AMR)
Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ)

Journal of Information Technology (JIT)

Organization Science (OS)

Journal of Management Information Systems (JMIS)

Strategic Management Journal (SMJ)

Decision Sciences (DS)
Management Science (MS)

Information & Management (I&M)

Applied Management Journals

Information Systems Journal (ISJ)
Information Systems Research (ISR)
Management Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ)
Journal of the Association for Information Systems
(JAIS)
Communications of the Association for Information
Systems (CAIS)

Harvard Business Review (HBR)
California Management Review (CMR)
Sloan Management Review (SLR)
IS Academic Conferences
International Conference of Information Systems (ICIS)
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
(HICSS)
AMCIS
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Table 1 - Continued
Trade Journals
IBM Systems Journal
!!

Global Services
!!

CIO Magazine

Information Week
Publications from Professional organizations

Global Services Media
IAOP

Outsourcing Institute
Sourcing Interests Group

ITGI

The Global Sourcing Council
Publications from Consultant Organizations

Gartner

Equaterra

TPI

Argument Mapping - Data Analysis
Argument Mapping was employed to analyze the wealth of data acquired during the data
collection stage. The use of Argument Mapping enables the evaluation of assertions
brought forward to support a particular argument. In the context of IT Outsourcing
Governance, the development of argument maps allow for the evaluation of different
views of governance by providing a structure that succinctly illuminates and summarizes
unsupported claims, potential pitfalls, and counterclaims that may be overlooked in a
simple literature review or that may be hidden in the rhetoric of a paper.
The analysis of arguments in this work is based on Toulmin’s technique
(discussed in Chapter 3) coupled with Fletcher and Huff’s (1990) graphical
representation of arguments to develop graphical argument maps that are easily
interpreted by the reader. Clusters of similar claims from the various papers, which are
assumed to underlie a common phenomenon, will be grouped in separate maps. In this
way, the different dimensions of outsourcing governance will be elucidated through
detailed inspection of the literature.
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In order to complete the argument mapping process, Fletcher and Huff (1990) suggest
multiple passes through the material to be coded, moving from the general to the specific
with each pass. These stages are described as follows:
•

First Pass: Read through the whole document, identifying topics, arguments, and the
most obvious key claims.

•

Second Pass: Mark all claims, and identify grounds for each claim.

•

Third Pass: Within each argument, identify sub claims, elaborations and reiterations.

•

Fourth Pass: Provide implicit warrants wherever they are not obvious.

Thus, four passes were performed on every article, and an example of the process is
provided in Appendix F. Once all claims were identified, similar claims were grouped
into an aggregate claim that depicts the commonality between them. This process is
repeated for sub claims, grounds, warrants, qualifiers and counter claims (rebuttals). This
modification to Fletcher and Huff’s methodology allows for the representation of
complex arguments from different sources (articles) in a succinct, more easily understood
map.
The main claims identified in the argument maps, which represent the different
dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance, became the base for the development of the
comprehensive framework for IT Outsourcing Governance described in the Results
section. Argument Mapping is a very useful discourse analysis tool, but its results are
limited by the content and extent of the existing literature. Thus, in order to gain further
insights into how academics and practitioners conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance,
the technique of Social Representations, described below, has been employed in this
work.
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Social Representations
Social representation research has been carried out with a multiplicity of methodological
approaches including cluster analysis, correspondence analysis, and multidimensional
scaling. In addition to these techniques, there are methods that were specifically
developed to better understand the structure of social representations, such as the analysis
of similarity designed by Flament (1986). This study follows the methodology used by
Jung, Pawlowski and Wiley-Paton (Jung et al., 2009), who based their study of the
structure of social representations on the core-periphery analysis described by Abric
(Abric, 2001). Abric proposed a structural approach, which is a direct extension of the
theory elaborated by Moscovici (1961), which enables the identification of the set of
stable concepts that constitute the very nature of the representation (core) and more
flexible contents that can changed over time or context (periphery). This methodology
mainly consists of two parts, eliciting social representations from respondents, and the
analysis of social representations (finding core-periphery structure) (Jung et al., 2009).
The selection of Social Representation Theory (SRT) and core/periphery analysis
as a methodology for this work is based on its logical consistency with Habermas’
Theory of Communicative Action, and Toulmin’s Informal Logic. At the foundation of
SRT is the assumption that social representations are constructed through social
interaction (anchoring and objectification). The validity of claims, or the force of the
better argument, will be reflected by the continuous process of objectification and
anchoring that determine the core elements of a representation. Therefore, the selection of
SRT is completely aligned with the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of
this work.
!

51!

Data Collection for Social Representations
Social representations can be elicited through a variety of methods such as interviews,
focus groups, content analysis of documents, and free word association, to name a few.
The criteria for choosing a particular data collection method primarily depends on
research design considerations, as well as practical limitations that might hinder the data
collection capabilities of the researcher (e.g. time, cost, access to participants, etc.) (Jung
et al., 2009). Considering the constraints (time and access to participants) involved in
data collection in the present study, free word association online survey was chosen as
the data collection method. This method was determined to be best suited to this study
because study participants would be required to spend just a short period of time to
complete the survey, thus increasing the likelihood that participants would respond to the
survey, and the relative ease of the data analysis process since unlike interviews, the
results of a free word association survey do not need to be transcribed prior to coding.
It is worth mentioning that not all techniques of data collection are equivalent, and
depending on the purpose of the research, free word association might not be the
appropriate approach, regardless of its apparent advantages. Since the purpose of social
representation theory is to elicit core elements of a particular object or concept (Abric,
2001) it is important that the data collection method does not introduce any bias. In the
case of free word association, the lack of elaboration in the responses (usually limited to a
single word or short sentence) could lead to the researcher misrepresenting the meaning
of underlying responses of the subjects (Jung et al., 2009). In this study, the possibility of
misrepresentation of underlying concepts is greatly reduced by the development of a
conceptual framework of IT Outsourcing Governance derived from argument maps based
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on relevant literature. Another possible source of bias in social representations is caused
by the addition of “cues” for the subjects to stimulate associations to other concepts.
These cues are usually in the form of a definition or a sentence related to the main
concept of interest that will facilitate the job of the respondents. In the case of this study,
no such definition was provided because there is not a widely accepted definition of IT
Outsourcing Governance and, more importantly, the main purpose of this research is to
capture the different interpretations of the concept in order to capture the multiple
dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance without biasing the participants with a
particular definition.
The instrument used in this study was an online-based survey that asked
participants to write down three words or phrases that came to mind when hearing the
term “IT Outsourcing Governance.” The population of interest for this survey was IT
Professionals with experience in outsourcing and Academics deemed experts in the field
as evidenced by their track record in publications related to Outsourcing. A total of 60
subjects completed the study with 31 responses from academics and 29 responses from
IT Professionals. The instrument used, along with other details such as years of
experience in the field of the participants, is provided in Appendix A. The data analysis
process for Social Representations (described in detail below) included open coding
technique to identify relevant topics, and core periphery/analysis to elicit how
practitioners and academics conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance.

Data Analysis for Social Representations
The data analysis process began with the detailed coding of each word/phrase elicited
from the participants and identification of key topics (concepts). The responses to the
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survey were coded using open coding, which is a coding procedure in which codes are
not predetermined, but rather emerge from the data. This process resulted in 48 initial
codes that captured the responses of all participants of the survey (e.g. C1 Relationship
Management, C19 Academia, C12 Accountability, etc.). For example, “accountability,”
“decision rights” and “responsibility” were assigned to code C12 Accountability. Once
the responses to the survey from the 60 participants were grouped into the 48 initial
codes, a second reviewer was given the set of codes and responses identified by the first
reviewer. The second reviewer then proceeded to allocate responses to the codes
originally identified. The two raters were in agreement on 152 out of the 180 responses to
the survey (each of the 60 subjects provided three words), with a high inter-rater
reliability level (Kohen’s Kappa) of 0.837 (Fleiss, 1981) and a consistency rate of 0.844.
Inter-rater disagreements were then reconciled through discussion and consensus. Finally,
related codes were grouped into 20 topics (super-codes), as shown in Table!2.
Analysis of the Structure of the Social Representation
With all responses grouped into relevant topics, a core-periphery analysis was performed
in order to elicit the core concepts that underlie the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing
Governance. The criteria for determining core elements of a social representation were
laid out by Abric (2001). According to Abric, a core element can be determined on the
basis of symbolic value, expressive value, and associative value. Symbolic value is based
on the concept that central elements cannot be questioned or changed without affecting
the signification, or meaning, of the entire representation. Expressive value comes from
the assumption that central elements will be more frequently present than peripheral
elements in the discourse concerning the object than the peripheral elements.
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Table 2 - Topics of Social Representations of ITOG
Topics

Example Answers

T1

Relationship Management

Relationship, Relationship Management

T2

Contract Management

Contracts, Contract Management

T3

Conflict Resolution

Conflict Management, Conflicts

T4

Performance Control

Control Mechanism, Oversight, Costs

T5

Organizational Capability

Internal Capabilities, Client/Vendor Capabilities

T6

Difficult to Implement

Complex, Difficult

T7

General Management

Management, Managed Services

T8

Communication

Communication

T9

Trust, Ethics, Expectations

T10

Psychological Contract
Internal Organizational
Structure

T11

Inter-organizational Structure

Organizational Structure, Constitution
Formalized Interaction Structures, Management
Structure

T12

Accountability

Accountability, Responsibility, Decision Rights

T13

Policies

T14

Outsourcing Management

Policies, Rules of Engagement, Guidelines
Management Sourcing, Outsourcing Activities
Portfolio Management

T15

Academic Topic

Curriculum, Research

T16

Important for Business

Critical for Success, Important

T17

Human Resources Management

Knowledge Transfer, Attrition, Skills, Experience

T18

Service Quality

Service Levels, Reliability

T19

Partnership Quality

Partnership, Partnership Quality

T20

Security

Data Security, Security

Finally, associative value is established on the premise that central elements must be
associated with a larger number of elements than the periphery ones. In the current study,
only expressive and associative values were assessed. Symbolic value could not be
assessed in this study, as its assessment requires additional research settings such as
longitudinal studies, which are beyond the scope of this work.
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The core/periphery analysis, along with the assessment of expressive and
associative values, was performed separately for academics and practitioners in order to
elicit differences in the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance between
populations. Since social representations are shaped by societal interactions, it is worth
exploring how two different groups - academics and practitioners - conceptualize IT
Outsourcing Governance. Expressive value was measured by computing frequencies of
appearance of elements (topics) in the responses (Abric, 2001; Nicolini, 1999).
Associative value was assessed via sum of similarity. The fundamental component of the
analysis is the development of an inter-attribute similarity (IAS) matrix in which each
cell contains a Jaccard’s similarity coefficient, indicating the degree of co-occurrence
(proximity) for a given pair of attributes (Jung et al., 2009). Sum of similarity is
calculated as a sum of the similarities of each element (topic) to all others in the IAS
matrix shown in Appendix B. The higher sum of similarity a topic has, the closer
association or proximity it has with the other topics.
Social Representations, coupled with Argument Mapping, provide insights into
the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance. This conceptualization can now be
used to analyze different aspects of an IT outsourcing arrangement. One such aspect is
the management of the client-vendor relationship. This work focuses on the use of
Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM) Tools that are designed to facilitate the
management of outsourcing arrangements. In the next section, the data collection strategy
to study ORM tools, along with the client-vendor survey performed in collaboration with
the Cutter Consortium, are described.
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Data Collection for Outsourcing Relationship Management Tools
The widespread adoption of outsourcing arrangements has led to the development of
tools specifically designed to aid in the management of outsourcing relationships. These
tools collectively are called Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM), and offer
monitoring capabilities and analytics tools that organizations utilize to measure the
performance of the outsourcing arrangement.
The market currently offers a large number of ORM software packages. In order
to keep this work manageable, the list of tools selected for analysis closely follows the
report created by the International Association of Outsourcing Professionals (IAOP,
2011), which includes the following tools: Janeeva, Enlighta. EquaSiis, and Hiperos. It is
worth mentioning that the list analyzed in this work is a subset of the tools listed in the
IAOP report covering tools specifically designed for the management of outsourcing
relationships. Two other tools were originally included in the study and later removed
from the data set due to changes in functionality and accessibility for analysis. These
tools were Oblicore and Digital Fuel, which ranked amongst the most popular tools in the
market in the last decade. Oblicore, which among its clients featured AT&T and
Chrysler, was acquired by CA Technologies in January 2010 and has been repackaged as
part of CA Technology. The acquisition bolstered the IT management offerings of CA
Technologies but it made accessing Oblicore’s tools more difficult. CA Technologies has
integrated Oblicore’s functionality into its offerings with a prominent focus on SLA
management, and has been rebranded as CA Business Service Insight (formerly known as
Oblicore Guarantee). Digital Fuel was founded in the year 2000 and specialized in SLA
management and IT financial management deployed as SaaS solutions that plan, bill, and
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optimize IT cost and value. In June 2011, VMWare acquired Digital Fuel in order to
boost VMware management portfolio. Among Digital Fuel’s clients were IBM, Telus,
Volkswagen and Wipro.
In order to evaluate each tool, user accounts were created (when a free demo was
available), feature lists were compiled, and user manuals were downloaded to obtain a
comprehensive understanding of the capabilities of each tool. A brief description of each
tool is provided below. In order to help the reader visualize better the tools, Appendix G
provides sample screen shots that highlight the interface elements of some of these tools.

Janeeva (www.janeeva.com)
Janeeva is one of the most complete ORM tools on the market. Founded in 2004, Janeeva
has experienced dramatic growth through partnerships and acquisitions. In 2007, Janeeva
partnered with Syntel, a leading global provider of integrated information technology and
knowledge process outsourcing, in order to improve its offerings in the risk and
compliance areas.
Janeeva provides a one-stop shop for governance activities of outsourced
operations. According to Janeeva’s website, “with Janeeva, governance groups,
providers and internal customers know exactly where to go to arrange for additional
resources, raise or manage an issue, track SLAs, or compare performance across
multiple providers.” Janeeva is one of the most feature-rich ORM tools analyzed and it is
offered as subscription-based Software as a Service (SaaS), providing the scalability and
flexibility associated with cloud-based solutions. Janeeva’s flagship product is called
Janeeva Assurance, and its customers include Fortune 100 financial services, healthcare
and pharmaceutical companies.
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Enlighta Govern (www.enlighta.com)
Enlighta has been in business since March 2002 and offers a broad set of services. Its
flagship product is called Enlighta Govern and it includes a comprehensive set of features
for Outsourcing Governance that makes it a very complete ORM solution. Enlighta
solutions have been deployed at more than 2,000 companies for managing and governing
global services delivery, application support, back-office services, contact centers, etc.
Enlighta’s mission is to provide organizations with easy to use, highly adaptable software
solutions that can be licensed, implemented, deployed and supported at a fraction of the
cost of typical enterprise applications.
Enlighta uses metadata in order to aggregate data from multiple sources (email,
excel, ticketing systems, etc.), providing a holistic view of the outsourcing arrangement
to the user. The ability to aggregate data using metadata facilitates the decision making
process through the creation of executive dashboards that provide customized
information for senior management. In addition, Enlighta Web-Services API makes it
easy to integrate with existing tools, such as BMC Remedy and HP OpenView for
information feeds.
Enlighta is offered as SaaS or it can be locally deployed in the client-servers. This
flexibility addresses the issues of privacy and security, which are among the most
common concerns when adopting cloud-based solutions.

EquaSiis (www.equasiis.com)
EquaSiis was formed in 2009 as a wholly owned company by EquaTerra, and focused on
market intelligence and improving operational performance of companies through the use
software and tools to manage outsourcing arrangements.
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EquaSiis has continuously evolved to become an ORM solution that supports
outsourcing governance teams, shared services organizations, and teams managing
complex business and IT services and vendors. It provides a rich and highly configurable
set of tools and services that facilitate relationship management by automating the
transactional components of operational governance, while also providing decisionmaking support for more strategic work. One of the most appealing features of EquaSiis
is its integration with Microsoft products (Office, Outlook, SharePoint, etc.), which not
only facilitates adoption and utilization, but it also promotes collaboration between
parties. In 2011, EquaTerra, the parent company of EquaSiis, was acquired by KPMG.
This acquisition was performed in order to extend KPMG’s offerings and provide current
EquaSiis’ clients with access to expanded services, capabilities and support from a
leading global audit, tax and advisory network. At the time of this writing, EquaSiis is
still marketed with the same name but its website is now redirecting users to a new site
hosted by KPMG.

Hiperos (www.hiperos.com)
Hiperos, founded in 2006, is a highly customizable ORM tool offered as SaaS. Hiperos
has been designed from the ground up to support processes and controls that ensure
activities taking place outside a company’s four walls can be managed just as effectively
as those being performed internally. Hiperos list of customers includes MasterCard,
United Technologies and Microsoft.
There is a marked emphasis on collaboration and sharing of information within
Hiperos that goes beyond the automation of functions and processes. Hiperos provides an
integrated platform that includes active content (KPI libraries, regulatory compliance
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checklists) and an interactive community. The platform allows all key stakeholders to
manage and monitor performance, compliance, sustainability, risk and corporate social
responsibility through the creation of customized programs or views. The platform also
allows all stakeholders to share best practices with each other, in addition to external
colleagues, and peer companies.
The previously described tools provide an overview of the functionality that is
available to managers that decide to use ORM tools to manage their sourcing
arrangements. However, in order to better understand how practitioners manage
outsourcing arrangements, and to discover the level of adoption of ORM tools in practice,
a more thorough study is needed. Therefore, a survey was carried out in collaboration
with the Cutter Consortium (described below) to better understand the client-vendor
relationship and the adoption of ORM tools.

Client-Vendor Relationship Survey
In addition to the analysis of individual ORM tools, a survey was carried out in
collaboration with Cutter Consortium (Hirschheim et al., 2009) in order to better
understand client-vendor relationships and the adoption levels of ORM tools in industry.
Understanding the client-vendor relationship, and how outsourcing arrangements are
managed, can provide insights into the adoption of ORM tools. Traditional management
tools, such as formal progress reports, milestone reviews, or scorecards, are tools that
have been used in project management for decades. However, this approach can easily
break down when the information available to a manager is no longer current. Thus,
utilizing traditional management tools that were not designed to enhance real-time
communication between parties could seriously hinder the success of a relationship. In
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this context, ORM tools might provide the necessary functionality that could allow
clients and vendors to build a successful relationship.
The surveyed companies included in the study varied in size from 100 to 50,000+
employees, with IT budgets ranging from less than $100,000 (11%) to more than $100
million (9%). Fifty-one percent of the respondents hold senior management/policy
making or IS/IT management titles; 22% hold project management titles; and consulting,
software engineering/programming, and marketing/sales are among the other titles held.
The full results and demographics of the survey are available in Appendix D.!
!
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
In this chapter, a framework for IT Outsourcing Governance is derived from the literature
using the technique of Argument Mapping. In addition, the results of a social
representation study of IT Outsourcing Governance are compared to the literature-based
framework in order to elicit possible gaps in our understanding of IT Outsourcing
Governance. Finally, the findings from the analysis of ORM tools are presented.

Argument Maps
The literature review of IT Outsourcing Governance was used to create Argument Maps,
which were used to elicit the perceived nature of this phenomenon within our field. A key
finding is that the IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship Management are often
used interchangeably in the literature. This is depicted in the argument maps included in
Appendix E. Likewise, four main dimensions emerged as key components of IT
Outsourcing Governance: Partnership Quality, Service Quality, Conflict Resolution, and
Formal and Informal Control (Dual Nature of the Relationship). Each of these
dimensions was further studied by performing an in-depth literature review with
corresponding argument maps for each. This process yielded a set of sub-dimensions for
IT Outsourcing Governance that relate back to the main dimensions previously identified.
A summary of the various dimensions and sub-dimensions can be found in Figure!5,
while the detailed argument maps can be found in Appendix E.
In order to better understand the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance,
a discussion of each dimension is provided below.
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Figure 5 - IT Outsourcing Governance Dimensions

IT Outsourcing Governance – Relationship Management
During the literature review process, it was observed that the terms “outsourcing
governance” and “relationship management” were used, by and large, in an
interchangeable fashion (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Gewald &
Helbig, 2006; Klepper, 1995). Furthermore, the few definitions that exist for IT
Outsourcing Governance all emphasize that, in addition to structure and decision rights,
IT Outsourcing Governance involves relationship management (Meng et al., 2006;
Simmons, 2005), thus contributing to making the boundaries between IT Outsourcing
Governance and relationship management even fuzzier.
This apparent confusion of terms was a puzzling finding that was difficult to
explain. A potential explanation for this phenomenon may be found by analyzing the
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nature of the concepts of IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship Management. IT
Outsourcing Governance is often described as an extension of the definition of
governance, which defines decision rights, accountability, and hierarchy within an
organization, whereas Relationship Management is associated with the management of
interactions between client and vendor.
On the surface, it seems that these two concepts should not be confused. IT
Outsourcing Governance relates to the structure or scaffolding for the relationship, while
Relationship Management deals with the management of the relationship. However, IT
Outsourcing Governance is different from its close relative, “governance.” Unlike
governance, IT Outsourcing Governance cannot exist if there is no relationship between
client and vendor (Relationship Management), and at the same time, a relationship
between client and vendor cannot prosper without the establishment of decision rights
and accountability (IT Outsourcing Governance). This apparent mutual dependence
between IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship Management will be discussed
further in this section. What appears to be the case is that this seeming interrelationship is
actually due to the dual nature of IT Outsourcing Governance and Relationship
Management, and that the results in the literature reflect such duality.

Partnership Quality
Partnership Quality is considered one of the main factors related to outsourcing success
and proper governance of the client-vendor relationship (Bennett & Sayers, 1994; Beulen
& Ribbers, 2002). Moreover, Lee and Kim (Lee & Kim, 1999b) claim that “Partnership
quality is not only critical to assure high-quality partnership, but also a key predictor for
managing outsourcing for user and business satisfaction” (p. 53). Partnering
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relationships hold potential benefits for both client and vendors but are usually difficult to
develop, and maintaining a good partnership can be costly due to the fact that an
outsourcing relationship is not a static challenge, but a dynamic process involving
communication, interaction, and change (Klepper, 1995; Lee & Kim, 2003).
Consequently, three main factors or dimensions, Psychological Contract,
Communication, and Trust were found to be particularly relevant to the concept of
Partnership Quality. These three sub-dimensions are discussed below.
Psychological Contract
The psychological contract is a key factor for partnership quality and outsourcing
success. IT Outsourcing Governance can be construed as a social exchange relationship
involving cooperation of the parties to achieve an agreed-upon goal. This agreement
normally takes the form of a legal contract in which mutual obligations are specified. In
this context, the vendor agrees to make specific contributions to the client in return for
certain benefits from the client. However, since written obligations can never be complete
due to the unpredictability of the market, contracts must be supplemented by unwritten
promises (Macneil, 1980). These obligations extend beyond mere expectations and are
based on the perceived promises of a reciprocal exchange (Koh et al., 2004).
One of the main researchers of psychological contracts is Denis Rousseau, who
has defined a psychological contract as “people’s mental beliefs and expectations about
their mutual obligations in a contractual relation”(Rousseau, 1995). Since it is
impossible to include all conditions in the legal contract, the parties often rely on the
spirit of the contract as embodied in a handshake. Ultimately, it is the individual’s beliefs
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and perceptions of his/her obligations, rather than the actual written contract that drive
behavior (Rousseau, 1995).
In order to better understand the mutual expectations that are developed in a
client-vendor relationship, Koh et al. (2004) carried out a sequential qualitativequantitative study that provides a summary of the perceived customer and supplier
obligations in a psychological contract.
Supplier Obligations
•

Accurate project scoping: Define precisely the nature and range of services
covered in the outsourcing contract, and flexibility in handling customers’
requests for changes in these services.

•

Clear authority structures: Delineate the decision-making rights and reporting
structures in the project, in terms of the roles and responsibilities of all parties
involved.

•

Taking charge: Complete the job and solve problems independently, with
minimal customer involvement.

•

Effective human capital management: Assign high-quality staff to work on the
project, and to minimize staff turnover during the project.

•

Effective knowledge transfer: Educate the customer in terms of the necessary
skills, knowledge, and expertise associated with using the outsourced system of
service.

•

Building effective inter-organizational teams: Invest time and effort to foster a
good working relationship between the team that is comprised of the customer
and supplier staff who are working on the project.
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Customer Obligations
•

Clear specifications: Understand and explicitly and comprehensively articulate
the requirements for the services covered by the outsourcing project.

•

Prompt payment: Pay suppliers on time and not withhold payments unreasonably.

•

Close project monitoring: Be actively involved in overseeing the project progress
by attending project meetings and discussions regularly.

•

Dedicated project staffing: Assign key employees who possess the required skills
and knowledge to work with supplier staff on the project.

•

Knowledge sharing: Provide information required by supplier, and to educate
supplier with the industry and firm-specific knowledge necessary to build or
operate the system.

•

Project ownership: Ensure that senior management provides strong leadership,
support, and commitment toward the project.

Mutually fulfilled obligations predict success over and above the effects of contract type,
duration, and size (Koh et al., 2004), thus highlighting the importance of psychological
contracts for outsourcing arrangements.
Communication
Communication plays a fundamental role in clarifying the mutual expectations and
obligations that clients and vendors harbor when they enter a legal and psychological
contract. According to social exchange theory, effective communication between parties
is paramount in order to achieve the intended objectives (Lee & Kim, 1999b). Open and
honest communication should lead to better-informed parties, who in turn, through the
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communication process, begin building rapport and become more confident with the
relationship and more willing to keep it alive and healthy.
The role of Communication in Partnership Quality is not only limited to the
clarification of mutual expectations, but also to the growth and fostering of the
relationship. Clear lines of communication allow partners to freely discuss the progress of
the project and any management concerns (Bennett & Sayers, 1994; Lee & Kim, 1999b).
Moreover, the implementation of information management and communication practices
within the outsourcing company supports the relationship between the outsourcing
company and the IT-supplier and contributes to the governance of a complex IToutsourcing partnership (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002). There are multiple methods for
promoting healthy lines of communication and effective information management
(Bennett & Sayers, 1994). These methods encompass holding project kick-off meetings
to provide orientation and introduce team members, regular status meetings where
progress is reported and issues raised, keeping detailed minutes that record action items
and decisions, and developing a documentation plan which includes a project file
containing relevant materials such as correspondence, comments, etc.
Another important factor that contributes to effective communication in IT
Outsourcing Governance is who is involved in the communication acts. Top management
involvement is often seen as a positive influence for the client-vendor relationship (Lee &
Kim, 1999b). Perhaps more crucial is the necessity for the people who interface with the
other party to possess both business and IT knowledge in order to appropriately fulfill
their duties (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002; Hirschheim et al., 2009; Kitzis, 1998). Historically,
there has been a disproportionate focus on negotiation skills and the crafting of formal
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contracts at the expense of the development of effective communication skills that are
often considered to be implicitly possessed by both client and vendor and hence overlooked, particularly at the commencement of the relationship. Organizations must go
beyond acquiring traditional negotiation skills and move toward developing effective
trust as well as building communication between parties in order to improve partnership
quality (Hirschheim et al., 2009; Lee & Kim, 1999b).
Trust
The psychological contract and communication between parties in an outsourcing
arrangement are important determinants of partnership quality. However, one of the main
factors considered to predict outsourcing success and partnership quality is the concept of
Trust (Cong & Chau, 2007; Grover et al., 1996; Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Lacity et al.,
2009; Lee & Kim, 2003; Lee & Kim, 1999b, 2005). Trust can be described as occurring
when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Morgan
& Hunt, 1994). Thus, in an outsourcing relationship, lack of trust might lead to
unwillingness from parties to delegate responsibility, and therefore result a subpar
partnership (Lee & Kim, 2005).
IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently inter-organizational in nature. As such,
the parties entering the relationship will try to reduce uncertainty as much as possible by
means of detail contracts, flexibility clauses, and service level agreements (SLAs)
(Willcocks et al., 2007). However, due to the uncertainty of market conditions, politics,
and societal changes, it is impossible to eliminate uncertainty through the use of formal
methods of control alone. In this context, Trust can help mitigate the extent of uncertainty

!

70!

that can exist in the inter-organizational relationship by discouraging opportunistic
behavior among parties (Cong & Chau, 2007).
In order to foster trust between parties, it is important to develop frequent and
clear communication, since communication is a necessary antecedent of trust. Trust will
evolve as the relationship between partners develops, and the commitment to the
partnership of the parties grows by acting predictably and fairly in the pursuit of common
goals. Additionally, striving toward the achievement of mutual benefits increases the
perception of closeness and trust between parties (Kern & Willcocks, 2000). When
common goals and benefits are attained, the partnership strengthens and a sense of
chemistry between client and vendor develops and results in increased trustworthiness
between parties (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).
In summary, fostering a cooperative relationship based on trust, business
understanding, benefit and risk share, and commitment is critical to reap the greatest
benefits from IT outsourcing. Partnership quality, thus, is not only critical to assure highquality partnership, but also a key predictor for managing outsourcing for user and
business satisfaction (Lee & Kim, 2003; Lee & Kim, 1999b).

Service Quality
Service Quality is highly related to Partnership Quality, and as such, some of the factors
that will foster a beneficial partnership, such as Trust and Communication, will also have
a positive effect on Service Quality. According to Grover et al. (Grover et al., 1996),
Service Quality and the establishment of elements of a partnership are important
determinants of outsourcing success. The perceived quality of a service is highly
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subjective because services are intangible – they are not things, they are processes. A
traditional view of Service Quality evaluation contends that consumers tend to compare
expected service levels with the actual service received in order to assess quality
(Gronroos, 1983). Because services are fundamentally different from physical goods, the
evaluation of Service Quality is a contentious issue due to the intangible nature of
services (Schonberger, 1980). For example, the manner in which a service is performed is
an integral part of the service involving simultaneous production of the service by the
vendor, and consumption of said service by the client (Bowen & Schneither, 1988;
Shostack, 1987). Since most intangible products or services can seldom be tried out, or
inspected, clients rely on surrogates to evaluate quality of service (Levitt, 1981). In this
context, the three main dimensions that compose Service Quality were found to be
Communication, Trust and Satisfaction, and Personnel Involvement. These subdimensions are discussed below.
Communication
As previously discussed, effective communication is one of the foundations of a
successful partnership (Lee & Kim, 1999b). In the context of Service Quality,
Communication is seen as a fundamental tool for information sharing, and vendor control
(Mao et al., 2008). Communication is key in clarifying expectations and responsibilities
for both client and vendor (Bennett & Sayers, 1994). Increasing the depth and range of
available information by using multiple mediums of communication such as progress
reports, shared project plans, meetings, and informal communication not specified in the
contract helps maintain service quality while reducing the opportunity for “slippage” in
the progress of the project (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Mao et al., 2008).
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In addition to sharing information, effective communication can promote trust in
the relationship (Mao et al., 2008). Regular communication between the outsourcing
company and the IT-supplier is considered essential in establishing flexible partnerships
(Beulen & Ribbers, 2007). Although fostering informal communication can help address
issues not specifically considered in the contract, an organized, multilevel communication
structure contributes to a flexible IT outsourcing partnership and helps to keep control of
the sourcing arrangement (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994). Therefore, the use of
Outsourcing Relationship Management tools which can provide a multitude of functions,
such as a means for shared access between client and vendor, a channel for real time
communication, or a venue for milestones and deliverables tracking, can positively affect
Service Quality (Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Hirschheim et al., 2009).
Trust and Satisfaction
In the context of Service Quality, trust and satisfaction are often mentioned together, and
thus they are analyzed together as well (Kern & Blois, 2002; Lee & Kim, 1999a). The
development of Trust between parties has a direct impact on project quality and overall
satisfaction with the client-vendor relationship (Cong & Chau, 2007; Grover et al., 1996;
Mao et al., 2008). However, a necessary condition for the development of trust between
the parties, is Satisfaction with Service Quality, since only through high satisfaction
levels can confidence in the vendor be built, which ultimately leads to trust (Kern &
Blois, 2002; Lee & Kim, 1999a). Sabherwal (1999) identified different types of trust in
client-vendor relationships:
•

Calculus-based Trust: Rooted in rewards and punishment associated with a
particular project.
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•

Knowledge-based Trust: Depends on the two parties knowing each other well.

•

Identification-based Trust: Occurs when the two parties identify with each other’s
goals.

•

Performance-based Trust: Depends on early project successes.

When evaluating Service Quality, Satisfaction with services provided is related to
confirmation of expectations by comparing the expected service levels with the perceived
service received (Gronroos, 1983; Smith & Houston, 1983). As previously mentioned,
the intangible nature of services poses a challenge when attempting to determine Service
Quality. In this context, understanding customer expectations can greatly increase the
potential for satisfaction with services provided. Parasuraman et al. (1985) have
identified reliability, credibility, responsiveness, courtesy, understanding, and
communication as the main dimensions that comprise consumer expectations for services.
In addition, Kern and Blois (2002) claimed that in order to improve user satisfaction,
vendors need to have a greater understanding of their business, show more commitment,
and should possibly initiate investments beyond the terms stipulated in the original
contract to ensure that the working relationship is maintained and a partnership is
fostered.
To summarize, high satisfaction levels with services provided builds the
foundation necessary to promote Trust between client and vendors. Since Trust has been
identified as one of the main predictors of outsourcing success (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002;
Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Grover et al., 1996; Lee & Kim, 1999a, 2003; Lee & Kim,
2005; Mao et al., 2008) companies should continuously monitor the satisfaction of those
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receiving IT services in order to maintain a good relationship (Kern & Willcocks, 2000;
Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003).
Personnel Involvement
Another important factor related to Service Quality and outsourcing success is
determined by the personnel involved in the sourcing relationship. Studies have shown
that personnel continuity and top management involvement heavily contribute to the
quality of service provided, and overall satisfaction with the outsourcing arrangement
(Kern & Willcocks, 2002; Koh et al., 2004; Lacity et al., 2009; Lee & Kim, 1999a;
Quinn, 1999; Zviran et al., 2001).
Top management commitment has often been identified as an important factor for
IT Outsourcing success. Senior managers can help by making critical decisions and
quickly resolve conflicts that might arise in the course of business (Zviran et al., 2001). In
addition to showing commitment to the relationship, top management involvement also
helps to deal with situations or issues that are not fully contemplated in the original
contract and must be resolved through negotiation (Beulen & Ribbers, 2007; Lacity &
Willcocks, 1998; Lacity et al., 2009; Quinn, 1999).
Another important factor affecting Service Quality is personnel continuity. In
order to maintain and a foster a partnership, organizations should strive to build rapport
among the personnel involved in the sourcing arrangement. Shifting people off and on the
project results in discontinuity in the management of the partnership with the consequent
potential for negative impacts in trust and satisfaction (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002).
Although fostering a cordial relationship amongst personnel involved in the client-vendor
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relationship is important, organizations should be aware that if these relationships grow
too close, the problem of dependency arises, in which only people in the “in-group”
understand the background and reasons behind decisions made for the project. When
taken to an extreme, this dependency situation can hinder parties from terminating the
contract or aggressively negotiating new terms of service due to a sense of loyalty that
arises from a relationship that moved from a cordial professional interaction to a
relationship that is closer to friendship (Kern & Willcocks, 2002).
Because of the imprecise nature of services and the difficulty in assuring
consistent quality, clients and vendors establish relationships (e.g., partnerships) in an
effort to better specify service requirements and desired quality levels. In doing so,
organizations must strike a balance between a cordial working relationship and becoming
dependent on each other to the point where their decision-making might be compromised.

Formal and Informal Control
IT Outsourcing Governance is a complex arrangement that encompasses relationship
management as well as the establishment of formal structures of control (Simmons,
2005). Consequently, the implementation of effective formal and informal methods of
control will have a direct impact on the performance of the outsourcing arrangement
(Gewald & Helbig, 2006; Hirschheim et al., 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) due to the
need for well-crafted contracts to clearly define responsibilities and effective relationship
management that can help foster a partnership and quickly adapt the working relationship
and the terms of the contract (if necessary) to respond to market changes. The importance
of implementing both contract management as well as relationship management is
highlighted by Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994) by claiming that “proper management of
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the relationship is equally or more important than the basic contract management.” In
the context of IT Outsourcing Governance, the concepts of formal and informal methods
of control have been segmented into three main areas or dimensions: Contractual
Flexibility, Service Level Agreements (SLA’s), and the Complementary Nature of
Contract and Relationship Management. These are discussed below.
Contractual Flexibility
The logic behind Contractual Flexibility is fairly straightforward. Organizations must be
able to adjust to unforeseen situations that can’t possibly have been included in the
original contract; thus, organizations should strive to include flexibility clauses into the
contract, or build a relationship that would enable adjustments to changing conditions
(Goo et al., 2009; Lacity et al., 2009; Willcocks et al., 2007). Moreover, purely contractdriven control can be considered to be impractical because a contract cannot possibly
include any and all eventualities that might occur during the term of a contract. Thus,
adjustments to the contract will have to be made over the course of a project (Cong &
Chau, 2007; Natovich, 2003).
Contractual Flexibility can be achieved through the addition of clauses in the
original contract during the negotiation process (Willcocks et al., 2007). In addition to
flexibility clauses, the development of a partnership has been found to add flexibility to a
working relationship (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994). In order to structure a sourcing
relationship, organizations must have contract and management tools in place to provide
a clear point of contact and ensure effective communication between parties, and thus
contributes to the governance of the IT outsourcing partnership (Beulen & Ribbers,
2002).
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To summarize, the contract should be designed to be flexible with the ability to
change and grow as circumstances dictate. In this context, establishing a partnership will
help resolve issues that might arise when changes need to be made to the original
contract, which will increase the chances of success (Cong & Chau, 2007; Fitzgerald &
Willcocks, 1994; Lacity et al., 2009).
Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
The prevalent perspectives that underlie most research in inter-organizational relationship
management focus on formal control and relational governance (Goo & Huang, 2008;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The formal control aspect of the relationship often takes the
form of a formal contract with the addition of a Service Level Agreement (SLA). An
SLA is a formal written agreement that is most often developed jointly by the client and
vendor, and specifies products or services to be provided at a certain level in an
outsourcing arrangement (Goo & Huang, 2008). Performance measurement is paramount
for a successful outsourcing relationship, and in this context, SLAs play a key role in
controlling for timeliness, accuracy, service availability, response to unforeseen
emergencies and conflicts (Domberger et al., 2000; Gellings, 2007).
SLAs are important because they provide the standards and controls that
contribute to the strengthening of the relationship while providing the empirical data for
measuring the success of the relationship (Alborz et al., 2003; McFarlan & Nolan, 1995).
In order to better understand the nature of SLAs, Goo, Kishore, Rao and Nam (Goo et al.,
2009) carried out a study that identified three main characteristics of SLAs that are
important for outsourcing arrangements. The characteristics can be summarized as
follow:
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•

Foundation Characteristics: These characteristics set clear standards of conduct
by defining what client and vendors are obligated to deliver and at what cost.
They include provisions that specify the key principles and agreements between
the parties, the key process owners and their roles and responsibilities, and the
target levels of product and service performance.

•

Change Characteristics: Change characteristics determine how uncertainties can
be handled throughout the relationship. They include provisions concerning
processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes of future demand, processes for
implementing foreseeable contingencies and changes, and efficient adjustments in
the contract.

•

Governance Characteristics: These characteristics specify ways to maintain the
relationship through a clear statement of the measurements, penalty and
incentives, conflict arbitration, and methods and channels of communication.

SLAs play an important role in the formal control aspect of the relationship, but are also
often considered important to foster the informal aspect of the client vendor relationship.
Trust and commitment in outsourcing relationships can be nurtured over time through
joint development of SLAs as well as ongoing exchanges guided by the elements of
SLAs (Goo & Huang, 2008).
Complementary Nature of Contracts and Informal Relationship
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is often used to explain how client and vendors
develop governance models in outsourcing arrangements (Goo et al., 2007; Goo et al.,
2009). TCE suggests that outsourcing parties will attempt to align governance features of
the relationship to match known exchange hazards, such as asset investments, difficult
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difficult performance measurement, or uncertainty. As exchange hazards increase, so
must contractual safeguards, if contracting has been chosen as the governance mechanism
(Williamson, 1985). However, explaining the relationship between organizations from a
purely economic point of view is not advisable because inter-organizational relationships
form out of the social learning experiences based on sequential social interactions
between parties (Lee & Kim, 1999b; Szu-Yuan et al., 2002). Moreover, in the IT field in
particular, an evolution in the nature of outsourcing from a purely client-vendor
relationship to a partnership arrangement has been observed (Grover et al., 1996;
Hirschheim et al., 2009). Consequently, it is important for clients and vendors to develop
the organizational capacity to manage and foster the informal relationship between
parties, because informal relationship management provides the means for developing
common goals and objectives between the client and vendor.
Although it is widely accepted that informal methods of control can play a role in
outsourcing arrangements (Dibbern et al., 2004; Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Goo &
Huang, 2008; Goo et al., 2007; Goo et al., 2009; Grover et al., 1996; Lee & Kim, 2003;
Lee, 2001; Lee & Kim, 1999b, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Willcocks et al., 2007),
there are different views regarding whether informal relationships act as substitutes or
complements of formal methods of control. Proponents of the substitution view claim
that informal relationships eliminate the need for formal contracts due to the growth in
trust among parties as the relationship evolves (Gulati, 1995; Macaulay, 1963). In
addition, some may argue that contracts may actually hinder the development of a
relationship since the elaboration of a detailed contract can be construed as lack of trust,
and can encourage opportunistic behavior with respect to actions that cannot be specified
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within a formal contract (Ghoshal & Morgan, 1996). More recently, Poppo and Zenger
(2002) carried out a study to precisely address the substitute/complement argument. The
results of the study show that the formal contract and informal relationships work as
complements rather than substitutes. Poppo and Zenger suggest that “managers tend to
employ greater levels of relational norms as their contracts become increasingly
customized, and to employ greater contractual complexity as they develop greater levels
of relational governance” (p. 721). Detailed contracts minimize risk and promote the
longevity of the relationship by increasing the penalties associated with the severance of
said relationship (Baker et al., 2002). Furthermore, the development of a detailed contract
and the corresponding SLA requires both parties to work as a team in the negotiations in
order to arrive to terms that are mutually beneficial. This social interaction serves as the
foundation for the development of a relationship between parties, while the continuity of
the relationship can lead to mutually agreed-upon refinements to the contract to reflect
lessons learned during the project’s execution (Goo et al., 2009).

Conflict Resolution
Although Conflict Resolution is often mentioned as an important factor for outsourcing
success and relationship management in the literature (Kern & Willcocks, 2000; Kern &
Willcocks, 2002; Klepper, 1995; Kumar & van Dissel, 1996; Lacity & Willcocks, 2000;
Lee & Kim, 1999b; Natovich, 2003), its importance is not reflected accordingly by level
of treatment of this topic in our field. Even though Kern and Willcocks (2000) go as far
as to claim that “A successful relationship is identifiable by the way it handles conflict
situations,” the dearth of research exclusively focused on conflict resolution in the IS
literature only allows for a superficial analysis of this dimension, which is represented by
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the following three overarching dimensions: Communication, Formal Control, and
Negotiation Management (bargaining). The first two dimensions (Communication and
Contractual Flexibility) have previously been discussed in the analysis of Partnership
Quality and Formal Control and therefore, these dimensions will be briefly discussed in
order to avoid redundancy.
Contractual Flexibility
Effective Formal Controls, in the form of a detailed contract and SLA, are considered
important factors in minimizing conflicts (Lynch, 2000; Natovich, 2003). Natovich and
Lynch advocate for flexible contracts that allow for adjustments to respond to changes in
an evolving environment and to avoid contract driven management since it leads to the
reduction of trust and commitment between parties.
The treatment given to conflict resolution in the context of formal control is
basically reduced to simply stating the advantages of formal and informal control, as
previously discussed, without actually investigating what should be the best practices for
conflict resolution in terms of formal procedures for escalation of conflicts, policies that
could be enacted to reduce conflicts, and the effect of penalties and rewards in the
prevention of conflicts.
Communication
Good communication can help parties achieve expectations, avoid conflicts, and facilitate
solutions to problems (Kern & Willcocks, 2000). Frequent communication can help
develop trust between client and vendor, which in turn can improve the formal and
informal aspects of the relationship (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Dwyer et al., 1987).
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According to Lynch (2000), open and frequent communication is key to avoid problems
and unpleasant surprises in the relationship.
Another aspect of Communication applied to conflict resolution is the proper
alignment of expectations between client and vendors; the misalignment of expectations
is often found to be root cause of problems in relationships (Kern & Willcocks, 2000;
Vowler, 1996). The importance of the alignment of expectations between client and
vendors was previously discussed during the analysis of Partnership Quality and the
Psychological Contract between parties. The observed treatment of the role of
communication in conflict resolution does not take into account factors such as proper
training, communication tools, appropriate channels of communications for escalation of
conflicts, etc.
Negotiation Management
Negotiation Management refers to the bargaining process that occurs during contract
negotiations at the beginning of the relationship or when circumstances require
adjustments in performance goals, or contractual terms (Klepper, 1995). According to
Klepper, bargaining is critical to conflict resolution because it serves as a medium for
relationship development, and foments trust and communication between parties
(Klepper, 1995). Disagreements between client and vendor are a natural part of the
outsourcing relationship. However, these disagreements can become dangerous when the
engagement falls into a vicious cycle in which lack of trust leads to a conflict that yields
poor performance, which in turn damages the trust even more and causes more conflicts
(Natovich, 2003). In addition, the level of interdependence between organizations is
likely to influence the potential and source for conflict. The higher the interdependence,
!

83!

the higher the risk for conflict due to the inherent need for increased coordination that is
required to support a highly interdependent relationship (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996;
Robey & Sales, 1994). The coordination task can greatly be improved by the
development of procedures for information sharing, a clear specification of roles, rights,
and obligations, and an appropriate governance structure. The potential risk of conflict is
reduced with greater structure (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).
Another important aspect of the bargaining process that can help with conflict
resolution is the achievement of a “fair deal” for all parties. In this context, a degree of
cultural similarity can have a positive impact in developing a notion of a fair deal
between client and vendor (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Henderson, 1990; Lasher et
al., 1991). It is worth mentioning that although the concept of cultural similarity has great
intuitive appeal and theoretical support, Lee and Kim found that its impact on partnership
quality is negligible (Lee & Kim, 1999b). This contradiction in results could be due to
the operationalization of the constructs used by Lee and Kim, or as a direct consequence
of the study design they used. They did not track outsourcing relationships over time,
which would make it very difficult to assess whether improvements in cultural
similarities over time had a positive impact on conflict resolution and partnership quality.

IT Outsourcing Governance Framework
Based on the results of the argument map methodology, we can summarize the relevant
dimensions surrounding the discourse on IT Outsourcing Governance with a framework
that highlights the dual nature of Outsourcing Governance (formal/objective, and
informal/subjective), along with the different dimensions that comprise this concept.
Based on the discourse analysis, the different dimensions have been positioned within the
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framework so as to reflect their formal or informal nature. The framework, along with a
brief discussion of its components, is described below.
•

External Environment and Business Environment reflects the socio- and geopolitical conditions in which organizations exist and the market conditions under
which they perform their activities. These factors are not studied in this work, but
are included in the framework to show the awareness of their existence.

•

Governance Structure refers to the hierarchies that are used to delegate decisionmaking rights within an outsourcing arrangement. Therefore, this dimension is
predominantly managed through formal control.

•

Service Quality is inherently subjective. As depicted in the argument maps, this
dimension focuses on trust building, mutual understanding, and fostering the
development of the relationship into a partnership.

•

Relationship Management highly overlaps with Outsourcing Governance, and it
spans across the formal/informal dimensions. This is to be expected based on the
dual nature of outsourcing governance/relationship management. Conflict
Resolution and Partnership Quality have formal and informal components as
well. Conflict Resolution deals with personality types, escalation procedures,
penalties, communication quality, training, monitoring tools, etc. Partnership
Quality focuses on Service Level Agreements (SLAs), communication channels,
monitoring tools, and culture matching, to name a few.

This framework summarizes the major areas that were identified during the literature
review and discourse analysis stage.
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Figure 6 - IT Outsourcing Governance Framework
The main goal of the framework is to highlight the dual nature of IT Outsourcing
Governance (ITOG) and how the major dimensions that relate to this concept fit within
the formal/informal aspects of ITOG. A potential shortcoming of a framework developed
from a literature review is that it might reflect a less-than-current understanding of IT
Outsourcing Governance, since it can take several years for an academic article to be
published. Thus, in order to capture the most current understanding of this topic, a social
representations survey of practitioners and academics was performed. This survey
provides another source of data that can be used to elucidate the key concepts comprising
IT Outsourcing Governance.
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Social Representations
The core/periphery analysis used in this study is based on the criteria described
by Abric (2001) that posits that a core element can be determined on the basis of
symbolic value, expressive value, and associative value, as described in Chapter 4. In this
work, we are only concerned with the measurement of expressive and associative values.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results obtained for expressive and associative
values along with the level of coreness of each topic. The level of coreness, and the
classification of each topic into the core or periphery category, were obtained by
performing a core periphery analysis which was developed by Borgatti and Everett
(1999). This technique simultaneously takes into account expressive and associative
values when determining the coreness of a topic, and was developed to detect a core and
periphery structure in network data, which consists of values that represent strengths of
relationships among items where coreness is considered a function of the closeness
(either correlation or Euclidean distance) of an element to the center of the network.
A software package for statistical analysis, developed by Borgatti and his
colleagues, called UCINET was used in this work. UCINET includes routines to perform
categorical and continuous core/periphery analysis. The difference between categorical
and continuous core/periphery analysis is that the categorical analysis allocates topics in
either core, or periphery, while the continuous analysis provides the level of coreness for
each topic. In this work, both techniques were employed to obtain the coreness values
and the allocation of topics to the appropriate category. It is worth mentioning that
although the saliency and the sum similarity of each topic plays and important role
determining the coreness level, they are not the only factors considered in the calculation.
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In order to confirm the results of the core/periphery analysis, a hierarchical cluster
analysis was also performed on the same data set, with the results showing the same
allocation of topics into two distinct categories (Core and Periphery). As can be observed
in the tables below, although there is considerable overlap between the conceptualizations
of IT Outsourcing Governance among academics and practitioners, there are still
significant differences in the results obtained that merit further exploration. These
differences might indicate a disconnect between the academic knowledge and how IT
practitioners actually work.
Table 3 - Core and Periphery Membership - Academics

Topics
T2
T1
T6
T4
T3
T8
T11
T5
T18
T10
T9
T19
T13
T12
T7
T16
T14
T15
T17
T20

!

Contract Management
Relationship Management
Difficult to Implement
Performance Control
Conflict Resolution
Communication
Inter-organizational Structure
Organizational Capability
Service Quality
Internal Organizational
Structure
Psychological contract
Partnership Quality
Policies
Accountability
General Management
Important for Business
Outsourcing Management
Academic Topic
Human Resources
Management
Security

Salience
(Frequency)

Sum of
Similarity

Coreness

11
11
7
12
2
2
8
2
2

1.069
1.155
0.867
1.062
0.534
0.767
0.766
0.653
0.867

0.473
0.470
0.342
0.315
0.219
0.208
0.208
0.205
0.189

4
4
2
4
4
4
5
4
2

0.705
0.843
0.677
0.868
0.427
0.569
0.071
0.000
0.000

0.167
0.155
0.153
0.152
0.136
0.097
0.024
0.004
0.003

3
0

0.000
0.000

0.002
0.000
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Membership

CORE

PERIPHERY

Table 4 - Core and Periphery Membership - Practitioners
Topics
T18
T4
T6
T1
T9
T17
T2
T8
T16
T12
T11
T3
T20
T7
T13
T19
T5
T10
T14
T15

Service Quality
Performance Control
Difficult to Implement
Relationship Management
Psychological Contract
Human Resources Management
Contract Management
Communication
Important for Business
Accountability
Inter-organizational Structure
Conflict Resolution
Security
General Management
Policies
Partnership Quality
Organizational Capability
Internal Organizational Structure
Outsourcing Management
Academic Topic

Salience
(Frequency)
8
11
9
5
5
9
7
1
7
2
2
1
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
0

Sum of
Similarity
1.545
1.426
1.161
1.271
0.881
0.765
0.800
0.644
0.476
0.626
0.702
0.644
0.367
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Coreness
0.534
0.502
0.335
0.314
0.260
0.257
0.151
0.145
0.144
0.142
0.120
0.110
0.085
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Membership

CORE

PERIPHERY

In order to better understand the relationship among topics, a graphical
representation of the network of topics was developed that shows their differences and
similarities. By looking at the network and the position and connections of a particular
topic, one can infer the different conceptualizations that academics and practitioners
might have on a particular topic. The network diagrams for academics and practitioners
are shown below. Each node in the diagram corresponds to a topic, with orphan nodes
grouped on the upper left corner of the figures. These nodes are not connected to any
other nodes in the network and as expected, were classified as peripheral topics during
the core/periphery analysis. The connections between nodes depict the degree of
similarity among topics, which is one of the determinants of coreness levels. The network
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figures provide greater insight into the difference in conceptualizations of each topic, and
thus the core/periphery structure of the social representation. For example, there are
considerable differences in the connections and strengths of the links for “contract
management” between both graphs. These differences seem to indicate, for instance, that
practitioners consider Communication, Service Quality and Psychological Contract to be
important concepts that relate to Contract Management, while academics seem to
emphasize Accountability, Performance Control, and Difficulty of Implementation when
referring to Contract Management. The same analysis could be performed for each topic
of interest, to form what is called an “ego network.” The ego network allows for a closer
inspection of the individual connections that each topic possesses. An analysis of the ego
networks (not performed here) may serve as a foundation for further research.

Figure 7 - Topic Network - Academics
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Figure 8 - Topic Network - Practitioners
The results of the social representations survey, coupled with the framework
developed through Argument Mapping, provide a greater understanding of the relevant
concepts for IT Outsourcing Governance. Another important aspect of outsourcing
arrangements worth exploring is how they are managed, and in particular, which tools are
used (described below), and how these tools’ feature sets fit with the relevant core
concepts of IT Outsourcing Governance.

Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM) Tools Analysis
One of the most interesting, yet shocking, results from the survey performed for the
Cutter Consortium (complete results are included in Appendix D) was that very few
organizations have adopted ORM tools to manage and evaluate contractual relationships.
As it can be seen in Figure 9, only 7% of the 45 organizations surveyed used ORM tools
to measure and evaluate performance of the contract after execution.
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In order to better understand the results of the survey, an analysis of several ORM
tools has been performed to compare the functionality that they provide. The tools
included in this analysis are Janeeva, Enlighta Govern, EquaSiis, and Hisperos. These
tools are a subset of the tools included in the IAOP report (IAOP, 2011) and were
selected based on accessibility to data (demo, user accounts, etc.) and their specific focus
on relationship management. The results of the analysis of the ORM tools are shown in
Tables 5 and 6. The categories used for comparison are Performance Management, SLA
Management, Change Management, Conflict Resolution, and Project Management. These
categories were selected because they represented the logical arrangement of
functionality or modules for most of the tools analyzed. In addition, the contents of these
modules resemble the dimensions of the outsourcing governance framework previously
developed.

!

Figure 9 - ORM Adoption among surveyed companies (Hirschheim et al., 2009)
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Table 5 - Comparison of ORM Tools
Module

Performance
Management

SLA
Management

!

Janeeva
- Automated web-based data
collection
- Personalized dashboards
- Automatic scorecard generation
- Easy-to-use self-serve report
creation
- Share reports and templates
- Flexibility to easily add and
change project, providers and
metrics
- Trending and predictive modeling
- Alerts and notifications
- Provider-to-Provider comparisons
- Validate, approve, and analyze
invoice data
- Drill down to supporting data for
problem diagnosis
- Record SLAs and store contract
terms for multiple towers,
agreements, and projects
- Automatically capture and
calculate SLA metrics
- Define multiple targets for each
SLA
- Define and manage performancebased pricing models
- Log changes to definitions,
metrics, and incentive structures
- Track events and generate
reminders of key contractual
obligations
- Automatically generate service
level default notifications
- Drill down to supporting data for
problem diagnosis

Enlighta Govern

EquaSiis

Hiperos

- Aggregate, validate and
summarize data from diverse
sources (excel, supplier feeds,
ticketing systems, emails, etc.)
- Executive dashboard that
summarizes aggregated data
- Near real-time insight into
engagement performance
- Ad hoc reporting and analytics
- Multi-dimensional drill-down
- Invoice validation and approval
- Service pricing modeling
- Automatic notifications

- Financial reporting
- Operational management and
analytical tools
- Business intelligence database
- Invoice error verification and
recovery
- Financial Modeling

- Data collection and aggregation
- Customizable reports
- Alerts and notifications
- Provider comparison based on
customizable impact categories

- SLA Monitoring and reporting
- Contract change management
- Compliance scorecards and
monitoring
- Executive dashboards for
actionable insight
- Automatic notifications

- Contract monitoring
- Compliance scorecard
- Holistic view to facilitate action

- Contract and provider monitoring
- Compliance scorecard
- Automated scoring logic of
weighted categories to track
compliance
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Table 5 - Comparison of ORM Tools (Continued)
Module

Change
Management

Conflict
Resolution

Project
Management

!

Janeeva
- Manage scope changes and new
service requests
- Manage additional resource charges
(ARC), scope changes, and new
service requests
- Built-in best practices
- Automatic approval tracking and
routing
- Automatic notifications
- Flexible form and process
definition
- Easily searchable record of
agreements
- Secure, auditable history
- Assign client and provider issue
owners
- Easily track resolution activities
- Assign and track specific action
plans
- Structured meeting planning and
follow-up processes
- Built-in best practices
- Clear escalation process
- Easily searchable knowledge base
of solutions
- Secure, auditable history
- Corporate-wide view of all
outsourced processes and providers
- Tracking of provider capacity, key
performance and financial metrics,
buyer satisfaction, and reliability
- Easy provider and project
comparisons
- Drill-down to detailed performance
data
- Communication forum that allows
providers to share news and
innovations
- Repository for provider agreements
and audits results

Enlighta Govern

EquaSiis

Hiperos

- Tracking and reporting of change
requests for application and
infrastructure changes
- Automation of multi-level
approval process
- Automatic notifications

- Transition management
- Automation and workflow
management
- Operational management

- Tracking and reporting of change
requests
- Automation and workflow
management
- Automatic notifications

- Issue management and escalation
- Automated alerts to stakeholders

- Issue Management

- There is no dedicated control for
conflict resolution.

- Work order automation
- Snapshot view of the actual
versus total approved spend for
work orders by owner, by supplier,
by region and by business unit
- Service request automation
- Automated assignment,
estimation, approval, escalation,
delivery, acceptance and feedback.
- Tracking and reporting of
milestones, deliverables, issue
escalations, risks, schedule, budget,
quality and volume metrics by
request category and supplier
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- Knowledge management
- Resource allocation
- Seamless interface with
Microsoft Office, Outlook,
SharePoint, Biztalk, and SQL

- Snapshot of all outsourced
processes and providers
- Tracking of provider capacity, key
performance and financial metrics
- Easy provider and project
comparisons
- Drill-down to detailed performance
data
- Communication forum that allows
providers to share information

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
In this section, the results obtained from the argument mapping methodology, social
representations survey, and ORM Tools analysis are further explored in order to
understand their meaning and plausible causes or factors that might have contributed to
the observed outcomes.

Argument Mapping
Perhaps the most salient outcome from the argument mapping processes is that IT
Outsourcing Governance seems to have a dual nature with a formal dimension related to
the governance structure, and an informal dimension that covers relationship
management. This apparent duality is discussed below.

Outsourcing Governance or Relationship Management?
During the argument mapping process, it was observed that the terms “outsourcing
governance” and “relationship management” were used interchangeably. A potential
explanation for this apparent confusion may be that academics, by and large, do not have
a clear understanding of the difference between the concepts of governance and
relationship management. Although it is certainly plausible that some academics could
confuse both terms, this phenomenon is only observed when dealing with IT Outsourcing
Governance. In the IT Governance literature the difference between governance and
relationship management is clear and beyond dispute. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the cause of the interchangeable use of these terms when talking about IT
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Outsourcing Governance might be related to the nature of this concept, and not an
inherent misunderstanding of the topic.
It is worth mentioning that IT Outsourcing Governance is different from its close
relative “IT Governance.” Unlike IT Governance, IT Outsourcing Governance cannot
exist if there is no relationship between client and vendor, and at the same time, a
relationship between client and vendor cannot prosper without establishing decision
rights and accountability. This apparent circular dependence between IT Outsourcing
Governance and relationship management is an example of what Giddens terms the
“duality of structure.”
In his Theory of Structuration, Giddens claims that it is improper to conceive of a
social system merely as the product of either deliberate human action or institutional
forces. The duality of structure refers to the notion that the structure or institutional
properties of social systems are created by human action and then serve to shape future
human action. As Roberts and Scapens (1985) note: “Through being drawn on by people,
structures shape and pattern interaction. However only through interaction are
structures themselves reproduced.”
Consequently, if structuration is used to better understand the relationship
between governance and relationship management, the underlying duality of IT
Outsourcing Governance arises as it can be conceived of as both the product of
relationship management and the very medium by which the relationship exists. In other
words, using the terminology described by Orlikowski and Robey (1991) this duality is
expressed in its constituted nature; IT Outsourcing Governance is the social product of
subjective human interaction within specific structural and cultural contexts - and its
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constitutive role - IT Outsourcing Governance is simultaneously an objective set of rules
and resources involved in mediating (facilitating and constraining) human action, and
hence contributing to the creation, recreation, and transformation of these contexts. Thus,
IT Outsourcing Governance is both an antecedent and a consequence of relationship
management.
Looking at IT Outsourcing Governance from a structuration standpoint focuses
attention on the social factors related to the development, evolution and implementation
of IT Outsourcing Governance among clients and vendors.
In the traditional conceptualization of IT Governance, exemplified in the popular
work of Weill and Ross (2008), the locus of attention is to align different governance
structures with the intended goals of an organizations. The constitution of the governance
structure however, is taken for granted since organizations can unilaterally decide what
governance structure to adopt. Since IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently a social
process where relationship management, and therefore social interaction, takes a more
prominent role, the locus of study should shift towards the understanding of how
relationship management, social interaction and organizational context help shape, and
are affected by, the governance structure agreed upon among parties of the sourcing
arrangement. In this context, the following factors appear to gain importance when
looking at IT Outsourcing Governance through structuration theory.
•

Governance structure constitution: The most popular perspectives into
governance structures are derived from the work of Sambamurthy and Zmud
(Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999, 2000; Schwarz & Hirschheim, 2003; Webb et al.,
2006) and Weill and Ross (2008) where the governance structure can take
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different forms based on who holds the decision rights. These views however,
seem to neglect the relationship management aspect of governance in an
outsourcing relationship. More recently, Schwarz and Hirschheim (2003)used an
extended platform logic model to study IT Governance that embraces a
relationship-based view of governance. In this context, the structuration approach
to IT Outsourcing Governance not only provides further support to Schwarz and
Hirschheim’s views, but also locates relationship management at the center of the
discussion. By focusing on the social aspect of ITOG, academics will increase the
understanding of how governance structures arise and how they impact the
underlying working structures within the client and vendor organizations.
•

Influence of human interaction: As previously stated, the interaction among
subjects has not been considered a major factor for traditional governance
research. Since IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently a social concept,
structuration theory brings focus to the conditions within which human interaction
reinforces, or changes the governance structure of the relationship.

•

Organizational context: This factor describes the organizational contexts in which
relationships between client and vendors are fostered in order to shape ITOG.

The above-referenced topics could be further scrutinized with additional research focused
on the impact that relationship management has on the governance structure of the
sourcing arrangement.
Defining IT Outsourcing Governance
Based on the IT Outsourcing Governance framework developed by the argument
mapping analysis, coupled with the relevant topics identified by the core/periphery
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methodology and the theoretical foundation provided by Giddens’ structuration theory, a
new definition for IT Outsourcing Governance is proposed in order to reflect its dual
nature in a succinct way. Thus, one could define IT Outsourcing Governance as the
process of defining decision rights within an accountability framework that is
continuously shaped by social interaction. It determines the rules, processes,
performance metrics, roles and organizational structures needed for effective
management of the client-vendor relationship. It is worth highlighting that IT
Outsourcing Governance is conceptualized as both a process and an outcome with
relationship management playing a key role.
Emphasizing the social aspect of the relationship between client and vendor to
study the governance structure of a sourcing arrangement would represent a shift in the
focus of the research on this topic.

Social Representations of IT Outsourcing Governance
The social representations survey that was administered to academics and practitioners,
along with the core/periphery analysis, showed that both groups have different
conceptualizations of IT Outsourcing Governance. Although the conceptualizations from
the respective groups contain some overlap, there are significant differences that warrant
further exploration. The table below summarizes the core/periphery results obtained,
sorted by level of coreness (from most core to least). The concepts in bold, underlined
font, indicate key differences in the conceptualizations of IT Outsourcing Governance
between academics and practitioners. These are explored further in the following
sections.
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Table 6 - Differences in Conceptualization of ITGO Between Academics and
Practitioners
Analysis of Academic Responses

Analysis of Industry Responses

Core Concepts
T2 Contract Management 0.473
T1 Relationship Management 0.470
T6 Difficult to Implement 0.342
T4 Performance Control 0.315
T3 Conflict Resolution 0.219
T8 Communication 0.208
T11 Inter-organizational Structure 0.208
T5 Organizational Capability 0.205
T18 Service Quality 0.189
T10 Internal Organizational Structure 0.167
T9 Psychological contract 0.155
T19 Partnership Quality 0.153
T13 Policies 0.152
T12 Accountability 0.136
T7 General Management 0.097

Core Concepts
T18 Service Quality 0.534
T4 Performance Control 0.502
T6 Difficult to Implement 0.335
T1 Relationship Management 0.314
T9 Psychological contract 0.260
T17 Human Resources Management 0.257

Peripheral Concepts
T16 Important for business 0.024
T14 Outsourcing Management 0.004
T15 Academic Topic 0.003
T17 Human Resources Management 0.002
T20 Security 0.000

Peripheral Concepts
T2 Contract Management 0.151
T8 Communication 0.145
T16 Important for business 0.144
T12 Accountability 0.143
T11 Inter-organizational Structure 0.120
T3 Conflict Resolution 0.110
T20 Security 0.085
T19 Partnership Quality 0.001
T13 Policies 0.001
T7 General Management 0.001
T5 Organizational Capability 0.000
T14 Outsourcing Management 0.000
T15 Academic Topic 0.000
T10 Internal Organizational Structure 0.000

Contract Management
The different levels of importance conveyed to contract management by academics and
practitioners is perhaps the most surprising finding of this study. As one would expect,
academics consider contract management a core concept when discussing IT Outsourcing
Governance. Practitioners, on the other hand, consider contract management a peripheral
concept. A possible explanation for this difference can be found by looking at the results
of the Cutter survey discussed in Chapter 4. As shown in Figures 10 and 11, IT
practitioners indicated that contract negotiation and management are largely handled by
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the procurement department or high level executives that are unlikely to participate in the
day to day management of the relationship. This could explain why practitioners that are
actually in charge of managing the client-vendor relationship do not consider it to be a
core concept, as they have little to no participation in the contract management process.

Figure 10 - Summary of results regarding contract management
(Hirschheim et al., 2009)

!

Figure 11 - Summary of results regarding contract management
(Hirschheim et al., 2009)
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These results seem to indicate that contract management may not be as important
to practitioners directly involved in the management of the client-vendor relationship as
academics think. This by no means implies that contract management is not an important
contributor to the success of a sourcing arrangement, but it could shift the focus of study
from contract characteristics (such as length, level of detail, etc.) to understanding who is
participating in the contract management process and how that participation correlates
with the success level of the sourcing arrangement.

Human Resources
One would expect that human resources are an important concern for practitioners when
managing outsourcing arrangements. It is surprising that academics almost completely
ignored the topic when responding to the survey. A potential explanation for this
difference could be that human resources are typically studied within management
disciplines, rather than in IS, and research in that area could be considered peripheral to
our discipline. Given the fact that practitioners consider human resources a core concept,
and since IT Outsourcing Governance is inherently a social process, human resources
should take a heightened role in academic research of IT Outsourcing Governance.

Communication
Common sense dictates that communication should be an important factor when carrying
out an outsourcing arrangement. However, practitioners consider communication a
peripheral concept of IT Outsourcing Governance, while academic consider
communication to be a core factor. Once again, the results of the Cutter survey can be
used to try to understand the reasoning behind this classification. Figures 12 and 13
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below summarize the responses of practitioners when queried about the importance of
communication for the success of the sourcing arrangement.

Figure 12 - Summary of results regarding the importance of communication in the
client-vendor relationship (Hirschheim et al., 2009)

!
Figure 13 - Summary of results regarding the importance of communication in the
client-vendor relationship (Hirschheim et al., 2009)
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As the figures show, although practitioners consider communication to be a key factor for
the success of a sourcing arrangement, only 40% of surveyed companies actually trained
their employees to improve their communication skills. One could infer that practitioners
are possibly taking communication skills for granted, rather than assigning it the level of
importance that it should have. In this context, academics should strive to make their
research regarding the benefits of effective communication more accessible to
practitioners since communication is paramount for relationship management, and thus
for IT Outsourcing Governance.

Conflict Resolution
This is another area in which there is a significant difference between academic and
practitioner perspectives. One would expect that conflict resolution would be of particular
importance in practice, although the results seem to contradict that assumption. Looking
at the results from the Cutter survey once more could provide some illumination. Figure
14 summarizes the results obtained regarding conflict resolution.
As the results show, the majority of surveyed participants do not provide formal
training to improve conflict resolution skills. Similar to the case with communication,
conflict resolution skills might be another area that practitioners assume are unnecessary
to develop in employees. The difference in the perceived importance of conflict
resolution is an important finding that could indicate a disconnect between academic
research and practice. The disconnect could be caused by a dearth of research in this
area, coupled with practitioners not having access to articles that highlight the importance
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of conflict resolution for the development of a successful relationship in a sourcing
arrangement.

Figure 14 - Summary of results - Conflict Resolution
(Hirschheim et al., 2009)

Argument Mapping vs. Social Representations
The results of the argument mapping methodology and the social representations
surveyed proved to be fairly consistent. Argument mapping is a valuable tool for
discourse analysis that facilitated the identification of relevant topics or dimensions.
However, one cannot infer importance of a concept through argument mapping. In this
context, the use of the core/periphery analysis filled that void by eliciting the degree of
coreness of each concept. Although there is not a perfect match between the results of
both methodologies, the high level of consistency between them is significant.
!
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Taken together, the results gleaned from each technique provide a much richer
insight into the nature of IT Outsourcing Governance. Argument mapping provides a
summary of the discourse surrounding IT Outsourcing Governance in the academic
literature, while core/periphery analysis not only provides validation to the argument
mapping results, but also enhances those results by adding levels of importance or
coreness to each concept. Consequently, academics can use these results to help guide
the development of new research strategies that would focus on the understanding of the
elicited core/periphery structure for IT Outsourcing Governance.

ORM Tools and IT Outsourcing Governance
Outsourcing Relationship Management (ORM) tools offer monitoring capabilities and
analytics tools that organizations utilize to measure the performance of the outsourcing
arrangement and manage the client-vendor relationship. However, as shown in Chapter 5,
the adoption of these tools remains surprisingly low.
The ORM tools analyzed in the work (Janeeva, Enlighta, EquaSiis, and Hiperos)
proved to be extremely sophisticated and powerful tools. Reviewing the list of features
and capabilities of the respective tools, one finds that they cover most of the topics that
were found to be relevant for IT Outsourcing Governance that were identified through
argument mapping and social representations. Since the features offered by the ORM
tools seem to match the dimensions found to be relevant for IT Outsourcing Governance,
it is worth discussing possible explanations as to why their adoption in industry is so low
(Hirschheim et al., 2009).
As one would expect, the features of the tools are developed around functions that
can be easily quantified and automated. Thus, most of the functionality found revolves
!
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around contract management, compliance, and progress reports. This level of
functionality, coupled with the fact that the procurement department plays a major role in
the management of these functions, could provide some insights into the low level of
adoption of ORM tools. There seems to be a disconnect or mismatch between the target
audience for these tools (personnel in charge of the day-to-day management of a sourcing
arrangement) and the functionality provided. One could make the argument that ORM
tools are better suited to support of the procurement department operations, and not the
needs of an IT manager.
Although all the tools analyzed had some functionality aimed at improving
communication between client and vendor, relationship management is a highly
subjective, informal process that cannot be packaged into a software module. Thus, IT
managers whose jobs are focused on the management of the relationship between client
and vendors might see little value in using one of these tools to perform their jobs. If, on
the other hand, an IT manager has a larger role in contract negotiation and management,
and handling conflict resolution, these tools could offer added value since they provide a
snapshot view of the sourcing arrangement.

Theoretical/Philosophical Foundation to Justify the Development of
Partnerships in Outsourcing Arrangements
!
As shown in the literature review, there appears to be a consensus that developing
partnerships when entering an outsourcing arrangement is the strategy that promotes the
most ideal conditions for a successful client-vendor relationship. However, these findings
have been largely based on empirical findings with little theoretical support.
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One theoretical lens that could explain why partnerships are the most successful
type of relationship is Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984b).
When we apply Habermas’ theory to IT Outsourcing Governance we find that an
outsourcing arrangement that is not established as a partnership is built on the foundation
of strategic action, where ego, self-interest, and hidden agendas are the drivers of the
communication between client and vendor. As such, client and vendor will soon find
themselves “misaligned” regarding goals, expectations, culture, et cetera. On the other
hand, an outsourcing arrangement that is established as a partnership is developed upon
communicative action, where the goal is the achievement of understanding where “to
reach understanding means that the partners in interaction set out, and manage to
convince, each other, so that their action is coordinated on the basis of motivation
through reason” (Brand, 1990).
The coordination mechanism of communicative action differs from that of
strategic action in that the latter is based on egocentric calculations and is coordinated on
the basis of a communion of interests (as is exampled in market economies), whereas the
former is based on the pure force of the better argument. Not that communicative action
nullifies individualistic motivations, but in communicative action, these ends are
subjugated to the use of language in a manner that is oriented towards achieving
understanding. The essential difference is that in strategic action, ego influences the
choice/decision not through criticizable claims couched in language but by sanctions, or
gratifications, force, or money.
Therefore, by moving from strategic action to communicative action, the
emphasis of the relationship moves from one of pure financial consideration to the
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achievement of common understanding, all while supporting individualistic motivations.
This change in focus helps us understand why outsourcing arrangements that have
developed into partnerships have been found to be more successful than those that have
not developed into partnerships. Consequently, it may be worth exploring which
organizational contexts and communication techniques promote the development of
communicative actions between parties engaged in a sourcing arrangement.

!
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The objective of this study is to improve our understanding of IT Outsourcing
Governance, which has become an increasingly significant topic in recent years (Dibbern
et al., 2004). To better understand this phenomenon, a comprehensive framework for IT
Outsourcing Governance was created and then used to analyze how academics and
practitioners conceptualize IT Outsourcing Governance through the use of core/periphery
analysis. In addition, a review of existing technology (ORM tools) developed specifically
to manage outsourcing arrangements has been performed in order to better understand the
alignment between technology and management practices.
An extensive literature review was performed and analyzed with argument
mapping in order to create the comprehensive framework for IT Outsourcing
Governance. Argument mapping proved to be a very useful discourse analysis tool that
was perfectly suited for the objective of this work. As the results showed, the process of
argument mapping helped elicit the different factors that academics considered relevant
when discussing IT Outsourcing Governance. One of the most striking outcomes of the
argument mapping process was the uncovering of the dual nature of IT Outsourcing
Governance, which is composed of a formal dimension dealing with governance
structures and control, and an informal dimension that deals predominantly with
relationship management. The observed duality of IT Outsourcing Governance is a key
finding of this work because it provides a better understanding of the concept and
presents a sharp contrast to the traditional view of IT Governance. Consequently, a new
definition of IT Outsourcing Governance has been proposed in order to reflect the dual
nature that was uncovered by the IT Outsourcing Governance framework. The new
!

110!

definition proposes that IT Outsourcing Governance is the process of defining decision
rights within an accountability framework that is continuously shaped by social
interaction. It determines the rules, processes, performance metrics, roles and
organizational structures needed for effective management of the client-vendor
relationship. This conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance represents a shift in
the focus of IT Outsourcing Governance and a departure from the traditional governance
approach championed by Weill and Ross (2008), which is based on a structure-goal
alignment perspective, to a relationship-centric perspective that focuses attention on the
social aspect of governance and how human interaction and organizational contexts
influence relationship management and governance structures.
In addition to the argument maps, a social representations survey was performed
in order to elicit differences in the conceptualization of IT Outsourcing Governance
between academics and practitioners. The results of the survey were used to perform a
core/periphery analysis in order to determine core and peripheral concepts used by
academics and practitioners when discussing IT Outsourcing Governance. The core
topics identified by the analysis show a high degree of overlap with the framework that
was developed from the findings resulting from the argument mapping technique. In
addition, several differences in conceptualization were observed between academics and
practitioners that could give rise to new research opportunities. In particular, the
differences observed with respect to contract management, and the role of IT
practitioners in their crafting, negotiation, and management, is worth further exploration.
The widespread adoption of outsourcing as a common management practice has
created, as a byproduct, a new market of tools designed to aid organizations in the
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management of outsourcing arrangements. These tools, collectively categorized as
“Outsourcing Relationship Tools,” have been analyzed in this work in order to better
understand their capabilities. The results of the analysis show that ORM tools have been
designed to mainly address the formal dimension of IT Outsourcing Governance, as they
focus on the development of status reports, compliance, automated notifications, etc.,
rather than on the informal aspects of relationship management, such as informal
communication and informal resolution of conflicts. According to the results obtained
from the Cutter survey, a previous study that explored the intricacies of the client-vendor
relationship, (Hirschheim et al., 2009) these tools seem better suited to manage the
functions performed by the procurement department, than to support the day-to-day
management of the client-vendor relationship.

Implications for Research
This work has several implications for research that have been briefly discussed in
previous chapters.
First, argument mapping has been demonstrated as a useful tool to elicit relevant
dimensions of a concept through the analysis of existing literature. Argument mapping is
a discourse analysis tool that researchers should consider adding to their set of tools for
discourse analysis.
Second, the results from the core/periphery analysis highlighted significant
differences in conceptualization between academics and practitioners. These differences
are worth exploring with further research into the topics of contract management,
communication, and conflict resolution. The difference in conceptualization surrounding
!
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the importance of contract management is one of the most relevant results of this work
and could create a new stream of research focused on exploring the role that IT managers
and other personnel involved in the day-to-day management of the client-vendor
relationship have during contract negotiation, management, execution and evaluation.
Third, a new definition for IT Outsourcing Governance has been provided based
on the results of the argument mapping analysis. This new definition, based on Giddens’
structuration theory, proposes a new perspective to understand IT Outsourcing
Governance, with relationship management at its core. In this context, academics might
embark upon new streams of research focused on how human interaction and
organizational contexts help shape the governance structure of an outsourcing
arrangement. For example, academics could better study the dynamics between the IT
and the procurement departments of an organization during the negotiation and
management of a sourcing arrangement. The findings of this work seem to indicate that
in actuality, the procurement department dominates contract negotiation, execution and
evaluation with limited participation from the IT department.
Fourth, a new theoretical lens has been provided to better understand the
evolution of a relationship into a partnership. This new lens is Habermas’ theory of
communicative action. Using this lens, the conditions for the creation of a partnership are
met when the parties achieve communicative actions as opposed to strategic action,
which dominates most commercial transactions. Thus, academics may wish to study
which social interactions, cultural factors, and organizational contexts promote
communicative action, which in turn will lead to development of a partnership. For
instance, academics could study the impact of communication training, and partnership!
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building activities, such as inter-organizational cross-training of employees, in companies
engaged in sourcing arrangements.
Finally, academics might investigate factors surrounding the adoption of the
ORM tools used to manage outsourcing relationships. The results of this work indicate
that there might be a lack of alignment between the features offered by ORM tools and
the functions performed by IT managers. In this context, further studies are necessary to
better understand the reasons underlying the observation that the adoption of ORM tools
is low among practitioners.

Implications for Practice
The results of this study may be highly relevant to practitioners involved in outsourcing
arrangements. The implications for practice can thus be summarized as follows.
First, practitioners may want to review the role of the procurement department. As
the results show, the procurement department may be impeding effective management of
the client-vendor relationship by taking responsibilities that are better suited to IT
managers.
Second, managers in charge of the client-vendor relationship should emphasize
skill development for relationship management, particularly since it is at the core of IT
Outsourcing Governance. In particular, practitioners should emphasize communication
and conflict resolution skills that are often taken for granted or assumed to exist.
Finally, the utilization of ORM tools may be beneficial for managers that actively
participate in contract management, conflict resolution, and performance evaluation.
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Limitations of the Study
The limitations to this study are placed in the following categories:
•

Scope
o The different dimensions of IT Outsourcing Governance were elicited from the
academic and practitioner literature using an approach other than the traditional
method of administering surveys to key stakeholders and performing a factor
analysis to elicit relevant dimension of the latent construct. Although the
conceptualizations of practitioners and academics were captured in the
core/periphery analysis and were used to “validate” the framework, this limited
participation of key stakeholders could be seen as a limitation since the social
representation technique used to elicit core and peripheral concepts produces
extremely short responses that require the interpretation of the responses from
the researchers.
o The analysis of ORM tools is limited to the consideration of how their
respective features cover the different dimensions of IT Outsourcing
Governance. Other possible reasons that could hinder the adoption of ORM
tools, such as price, ease of use, compatibility with existing systems, etc. were
not included in this study. Additionally, only a subset of ORM tools was
analyzed, rather than all available ORM tools in the market.

•

Generalizability
o The study takes a novel approach to identifying the different dimensions of IT
Outsourcing Governance. This predominantly interpretivist approach, based on
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argument mapping, and validated by core/periphery analysis, may not be well
received by an audience with a more positivistic viewpoint.
o The survey performed for the social representations analysis only included 31
academics (considered experts in their field), and 29 practitioners that are
actively working on outsourcing arrangements. This sample may not be
representative of the whole population, and thus, the results might not
generalize in the positivistic sense.

Concluding Thoughts
As the use outsourcing continues to grow and evolve, there is a clear and increasing need
to better understand how to effectively govern the increasingly complex set of vendors,
clients, users, etc., who are involved in and affected by an outsourcing arrangement.
Hopefully, this study has articulated why IT Outsourcing Governance is an important
area of study, and what concepts/constructs need to be examined in order to better
understand it.
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APPENDIX A – SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS SURVEY
Survey Instrument
The instrument used in this study is shown in the figures below.

Figure 15 - Survey Instrument - Part 1

!
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Figure 16 - Survey Instrument - Part 2

Summary of Results
A summary of the responses to the survey is given in the tables below. The summary
includes type of job, years of experience, role performed in the outsourcing arrangement,
types of services used/provided, or research areas in the case of academics.
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Table 7 - Job Description
#!

Answer!

!

1!

Academic!

!

2!

IT!
!
Professional!

3!

Other!

!

Total!

!

!

!

!

Response!

%!

31!

52%!

15!

25%!

14!

23%!

60!

100%!

Response!

%!

18!

30%!

7!

12%!

30!

50%!

5!

8%!

60!

100%!

!

!

!

!

!

Table 8 - Role in Outsourcing Arrangement
#!

Answer!

!

1!

Client!

!

2!

Vendor!

!

3!

Researcher!

!

4!

Other!

!

!

Total!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Table 9 - Areas of Expertise/Research
#! Answer!

1!

Application/software!
development!

!
!

Application!support!or!
management!

!

4!

Technical!support/help!
desk!

!

5!

Database!
!
development/management!

6! Telecommunications!

!

7! Infrastructure!

!

8! Other!

!

!

%!

46!

77%!

29!

48%!

31!

52%!

!

21!

35%!

!

26!

43%!

!

22!

37%!

27!

45%!

6!

10%!

!

!

2! Web!development/hosting! !
3!

Response!

!

!

!

!

!
!
!
!
!

!

!
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!

Table 10 - Years of Experience in Outsourcing

!

#!

Answer!

!

1!

Between!1!!
!
and!5!years!

2!

Between!6!
!
and!10!
years!

3!

More!than!
10!years!

!

Total!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!
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Response!

%!

20!

33%!

14!

23%!

26!

43%!

60!

100%!

APPENDIX B – IAS MATRICES
!
The IAS matrices used for the core/periphery analysis are shown in the tables below.!

Table 11 - IAS Matrix - Academics
!T1
T2
!
T3
!T4
T5
!T6
T7
!
T8
!T9
T10
!T11
T12
!
T13
!T14
T15
!T16
T17
!
T18
!T19
T20

!

T1
1.000
0.333
0.167
0.118
0.000
0.133
0.000
0.167
0.077
0.083
0.000
0.077
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T2
0.333
1.000
0.167
0.118
0.000
0.214
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.154
0.083
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T3
0.167
0.167
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.200
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T4
0.118
0.118
0.000
1.000
0.167
0.143
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.067
0.067
0.067
0.000
0.000
0.071
0.000
0.167
0.077
0.000

T5
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.167
1.000
0.286
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.200
0.000
0.000

T6
0.133
0.214
0.000
0.143
0.286
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.091
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T7
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.333
0.000
0.111
0.000
0.125
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T8
0.167
0.000
0.200
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.400
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T9
0.077
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.333
0.000
1.000
0.111
0.100
0.000
0.222
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T10
0.083
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.400
0.111
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.111
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T11
0.000
0.154
0.000
0.067
0.000
0.091
0.111
0.000
0.100
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.143
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
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T12
0.077
0.083
0.000
0.067
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.200
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T13
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.067
0.000
0.000
0.125
0.000
0.222
0.111
0.143
0.200
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T14
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T15
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T16
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.071
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T17
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

T18
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.167
0.200
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.500
0.000

T19
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.077
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.500
1.000
0.000

T20
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000

Total
1.155
1.069
0.534
1.062
0.653
0.867
0.569
0.767
0.843
0.705
0.766
0.427
0.868
0.000
0.000
0.071
0.000
0.867
0.677
0.000

Table 12 - IAS Matrix – Industry

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!
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APPENDIX C – IRB APPROVAL
!
The authorization form for the collection of data from human subjects is found in the
figure below.

Figure 17 - IRB Exemption Form

!
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APPENDIX D – CUTTER SURVEY
The results of the survey performed in partnership with the Cutter Consortium, along
with the authorization to use the results are shown in the figures below.
!

Figure 18 - Cutter Survey - Part 1
!
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!
Figure 19 - Cutter Survey - Part 2
!
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!
Figure 20 - Cutter Survey - Part 3
!
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!
Figure 21 - Cutter Survey - Part 4
!
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!
Figure 22 - Cutter Survey - Part 5

!
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!
Figure 23 - Cutter Survey - Part 6

!
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!
Figure 24 - Cutter Survey - Part 7

!
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!
Figure 25 - Authorization to Use Survey Results

!
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APPENDIX E – ARGUMENT MAPS
Buyers frequently underestimate the
time and attention required to manage
an outsourcing relationship (BendorSamuel, 2002)

As the service provider
takes on several
responsibilities, the role of
the retained IT department
will fundamentally change
(Gewald, 2006)

The more relationships you
have, the more important
relationship management
becomes. (Shahani, 2007)

the supplier will begin to
operate in a priority vacuum,
and service levels will
deteriorate because the
supplier's agenda will not be in
sync with the buyer's business
objectives. (Bendor-Samuel,
2002)

Managing end-user and
service provider relationships
are new disciplines which
have to be developed
(Gewald, 2006, Alborz et al.,
2004)

The relationship manager must
strike a fine balance between being
a logistics problem solver and being
a leader who can motivate and
facilitate superior performance by
the provider (Lynch, 2000)

The key to a successful
outsourcing project is a clear
definition of the project scope,
appropriate management tools,
close monitoring of the projects'
progress and top management
involvenment.

Service and/or product
delivery and its monitoring
was found to be the
fundamental driver of the
relationship for client
companies. (Kern, 2000)

Active management
participation is
fundamental to the
governance of the
outsourcing
relationship

70% of the client managers’ time in
post-contract management is spent
on managing relations

The elements of partnership:
trust, communication,
satisfaction, and cooperation, are
related to the perceived
achievement of benefits.
(Grover et. al. 1996; (Lee & Kim,
1999))

All companies agreed the
importance of continuously
monitoring the satisfaction of those
receiving IT services (Schwarz &
Hirschheim, 2003)

Proper management of
the relationship is
equally or more
important than the basic
contract management

Classical and neoclassical
contract theory suffers from a
rigidness that does not take
into account the relational
aspect in contracts.(Kern,
1997)

The management of the clientvendor relationship is composed of
two dimensions: (1) the crafting of
the sourcing arrangement, or
formal management, and (2) the
management of the external
relationship, or infor- mal
management. (Hirschheim et al.
2009)

The relationship needs to be
flexible, and have the ability to
change and grow (Cong, et al.
2007; Fitzgerald & Willcocks,
1994)

Firms strategically use
SLA to successfully
manage IT Outsourcing
Relationships(Goo &
Huang, 2008; Gellings,
2007)

Well structured SLAs
play an important role
in cultivating favorable
relationships. (Goo &
Huang, 2008)

Well-developed SLAs not only
provide a way to measure the service
provider’s performance, but also
enable effective management of
outsourcing engagements through the
development of partnership-style
relation- ships with high levels of trust
and commitment. (Goo et al., 2009)

You can’t put everything in a
contract, you can’t tie
everything down. (Fitzgerald
& Willcocks,1994)

Partnership quality may
serve as a key predictor
of outsourcing success.
(Lee & Kim, 1999)
Results show that fulfilled
obligations predict success
over and above the effects
of contract type, duration,
and size. (Koh et. al., 2004)

As these exchanges became
institutionalised the relationship
began to gain in status and benefits
became visible (Kern, 2000)

The involvement of senior
managers, and rigorous evaluation
processes were associated with
higher levels of IT Outsourcing
success (Lacity, 2009; Kern and
Willcocks, 2002; Zviran et al.,
2001)

Investing appropriately
in governance is
perhaps the best way to
protect a company’s far
greater investments in
outsourcing. (Shahani,
2007)

In those circumstances when
problems arose, both sides needed
to prove their willingness to
cooperate. (Kern, 2000)

Customers perceive supplier obligations to
be accurate project scoping, clear authority
structures, taking charge, effective human
capital management, effective knowledge
transfer, and effective interorganizational
teams. (Koh et. al., 2004)

Suppliers perceive customer obligations as
clear specifications, prompt payment, close
project monitoring, dedicated project staffing,
knowledge sharing, and project ownership.
(Koh et. al., 2004)

To improve user satisfaction, clients found that
vendors need to have a greater understanding of
their business and to show more commitment,
and should possibly initiate investments beyond
the terms stipulated in the agreement to ensure
that the working relationship is maintained. (Kern
& Blois, 2002)

Understanding the business
goals and policies of a partner
is paramount to the resolution
of conflicts

A successful relationship is
identifiable by the way it
handles conflict situations.
(Kern, 2000)

Finding a solution without
falling-out or having to refer
to the contract was found as
a sign of understanding and
cultural synergy. (Kern,
2000)

A sound governance of
the outsourcing
relationship is vital to its
success (Gewald, 2006;
Alborz et al, 2003; Kern
and Willcocks, 2001)

There is a direct correlation
between the investment that
organizations make in
outsourcing management and
their satisfaction with their
outsourcing engagement.
(Shahani, 2007)

Only through high satisfaction
levels can confidence in the
vendor be built, which
ultimately leads to trust. (Kern
& Blois, 2002)

Lack of management oversight
will cause problems. (BendorSamuel, 2002; Zviran et al.,
2001)

Successful IT outsourcing
relies heavily on a
psychological contract
between the customer and
the supplier. (Koh et. al.,
2004)

Contracts and relational
governance function as
complements rather than as
substitutes. (Goo et al., 2009;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002)

More contract detail, shorter-term
contracts, and higher-dollar valued
contracts were positively related to
ITO success. (Lacity, 2009)

Color Reference
Grouping of claims related to partnership quality
Grouping of claims related to two dimensions of partnership

Trust, norms, open
communication, open
sharing of information,
mutual dependency, and
cooperation are always
associated with higher
levels of IT Outsourcing
success. (Lacity, 2009)

Service quality and the
establishment of
elements of partnership
are important
determinants of
outsourcing success.
(Grover et. al. 1996)

Grouping of claims related to service quality
Grouping of claims related to governance of relationship
Grouping of claims related to conflict resolution
Represent combinations of two or more groupings
Shape Reference

Figure 26 - Governance/Relationship Map
!

142!

Claim

Grounds

Warrant

Counter Claim

Qualifier

<for outsourcing success>
It is critical to develop a
good rapport with the
manager of the consulting
firm. (Bennett & Sayers,
1994; Mao et. al. 2008)

Clear lines of communication allow
partners to freely discuss the progress of
the project and any management
concerns. (Lee & Kim, 1999; Bennet
and Sayers, 1994)

The implementation of IM by the
outsourcing company supports the
alignment of business and IT within the
outsourcing company and contributes to
the governance of a complex IToutsourcing partnership. (Beulen &
Ribbers, 2002)

Partnership quality was found to be
positively influenced by factors such as
participation, communication,
information sharing, and top
management support, and negatively
affected by age of relationship and
mutual dependency. (Lee & Kim, 1999)

Partnership quality may
serve as a key predictor
of outsourcing success.
(Lee & Kim, 1999)

The implementation of IM within the
outsourcing company supports the
relationship between the outsourcing
company and the IT-supplier and
contributes to the governance of a
complex IT-outsourcing partnership.
(Beulen & Ribbers, 2002)

Information Management
function (IM) is a
prerequisite to effectively
manage complex IToutsourcing partnerships
(Beulen & Ribbers, 2002)

Customers perceive supplier obligations to
be accurate project scoping, clear authority
structures, taking charge, effective human
capital management, effective knowledge
transfer, and effective interorganizational
teams. (Koh et. al., 2004)

Suppliers perceive customer obligations as
clear specifications, prompt payment, close
project monitoring, dedicated project staffing,
knowledge sharing, and project ownership.
(Koh et. al., 2004)

The cost of developing and
maintaining partnerships can be
high. (Klepper, 1995)

Results show that fulfilled
obligations predict success
over and above the effects
of contract type, duration,
and size. (Koh et. al., 2004)

Successful IT outsourcing
relies heavily on a
psychological contract
between the customer and
the supplier. (Koh et. al.,
2004)

Outsourcing relationship is
not a static challenge but
a dynamic process
involving continual
interaction and change
(Lee & Kim, 2003)

Color Reference

Partnership quality is not only
critical to assure high-quality
partnership, but also a key
predictor for managing
outsourcing for user and
business satisfaction.(Lee &
Kim, 1999, 2003, 2005)

Fostering a cooperative
relationship based on trust,
business understanding, benefit
and risk share, and commitment
is critical to reap the greatest
benefits from outsourcing (Lee &
Kim, 1999, 2003, 2005)

Service quality and the
establishment of elements
of partnership are
important determinants of
outsourcing success.
(Grover et. al. 1996)
Partnership quality and
outsourcing success have a strong
relationship (Lee & Kim, 1999,
2003, 2005)

The elements of partnership:
trust, communication,
satisfaction, and cooperation, are
related to the perceived
achievement of benefits.
(Grover et. al. 1996; Mao et. al.
2008)

Grouping of claims related to psychological contract between client and vendor

Grouping of claims related to communication

Mutual benefits, commitment, and
predisposition are key to
understanding the process of
outsourcing partnership development
in order to establish high-quality
partnerships with service providers
(Lee & Kim, 2003)

Grouping of claims related to trust and satisfaction

Represent combinations of two or more groupings

Such elements might be difficult to
build and sustain, and that tight
contractual relationships might be
required under certain conditions.
However, trust plays a central role
in the success of the IT outsourcing
relatioanship (Grover et. al. 1996;
Cong & chau, 2007)

Shape Reference
Claim

Grounds

Warrant

Counter Claim

Qualifier

Figure 27 - Partnership Quality Map
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Trust, norms, open
communication, open sharing of
information, mutual dependency,
and cooperation are always
associated with higher levels of IT
Outsourcing success. (Lacity,
2009)

Effective communication and
increased depth of information
transfer promote trust. (Mao et. al,
2008)

However communication has to be
organized. (Beulen & Ribbers, 2002)

Trust between client and
vendor can improve
customer relationship and
project quality (Mao et. al,
2008)

A multilevel
communication structure
contributes to a flexible IT
outsourcing Partnership
(Beulen & Ribbers, 2002)

Service quality and the
establishment of
elements of partnership
are important
determinants of
outsourcing success.
(Grover et. al. 1996)

Regular communication between
the outsourcing company and the
IT-suppliers is considered
essential in establishing flexible
partnership relationships.(Beulen
& Ribbers, 2002)

The elements of partnership:
trust, communication,
satisfaction, and cooperation, are
related to the perceived
achievement of benefits.
(Grover et. al. 1996; Mao et. al.
2008)

Only through high satisfaction
levels can confidence in the
vendor be built, which
ultimately leads to trust. (Kern
& Blois, 2002)

Changing people results in
discontinuity in the management of
the partnership. (Beulen &
Ribbers, 2002)

Color Reference
Grouping of claims related effective communication between parties

Continuity in personnel
availability per IT
outsourcing partnership
contributes to the success
of the relationship. (Beulen
& Ribbers, 2002)

Such elements might be difficult to
build and sustain, and that tight
contractual relationships might be
required under certain conditions.
However, trust plays a central role
in the success of the IT outsourcing
relatioanship (Grover et. al. 1996;
Cong & chau, 2007)

Service and/or product
delivery and its monitoring
was found to be the
fundamental driver of the
relationship for client
companies. (Kern, 2000)

To improve user satisfaction, clients found
that vendors need to have a greater
understanding of their business and to show
more commitment, and should possibly
initiate investments beyond the terms
stipulated in the agreement to ensure that
the working relationship is maintained. (Kern
& Blois, 2002)

All companies agreed the
importance of continuously
monitoring the satisfaction of those
receiving IT services (Schwarz &
Hirschheim, 2003)

Grouping of claims related to personnel involvement

Grouping of claims related to trust and satisfaction
The involvement of senior
managers, and rigorous evaluation
processes were associated with
higher levels of IT Outsourcing
success (Lacity, 2009; Kern and
Willcocks, 2002; Zviran et al.,
2001)

Represent combinations of two or more groupings

Shape Reference
Claim

Grounds

Warrant

Counter Claim

Qualifier

Figure 28 - Service Quality Map
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As these exchanges became
institutionalised the relationship
began to gain in status and
benefits became visible (Kern,
2000)

The implementation of proper contract & account
management that mirrors the organization of the
outsourcing company results in clear contacting
point for the outsourcing company and ensures an
effective communication between the outsourcing
company and the IT-supplies and thus contributes
to the governance of a IT-outsourcing partnership.
(Beulen and Ribbers, 2002)

In order to structure the
relationship and the
communication with
outsourcing companies, IT
services suppliers must have a
contract and account
management (CAM) in place.
(Beulen and Ribbers, 2002)

A partnership approach
of sharing risks and
rewards may be more
effective in bringing the
client and the vendor to
successful project
outcomes. (Natovich,
2003)

Contract driven control approach is
impractical and puts all the risk on
the vendor. (Natovich, 2003)

A degree of flexibility is
achieved through a
partnership (Fitzgerald &
Willcocks,1994)

Establishing a partnership
means that anything not
specifically mentioned in a
contract will not cause problems.
(Fitzgerald & Willcocks,1994)

Active management
participation is
fundamental to the
governance of the
outsourcing relationship
(Gewald, 2006)

The relationship needs to be
flexible, and have the ability to
change and grow (Cong, et al.
2007; Fitzgerald & Willcocks,
1994)

More than 50% of the alliances fail
due to relationship issues and not
because of bad contracts or
financial issues. (Gewald, 2006)

The management of the clientvendor relationship is composed of
two dimensions: (1) the crafting of
the sourcing arrangement, or
formal management, and (2) the
management of the external
relationship, or informal
management. (Hirschheim et al.
2009)

You can’t put everything in a
contract, you can’t tie
everything down. (Fitzgerald &
Willcocks,1994)

Partnership is one of the key
elements for successful
outsourcing.(Fitzgerald &
Willcocks,1994)

Firms strategically use
SLA to successfully
manage IT Outsourcing
Relationships(Goo &
Huang, 2008; Gellings,
2007)

Well-developed SLAs not only
provide a way to measure the
service provider’s performance,
but also enable effective
management of outsourcing
engagements through the
development of partnership-style
relationships with high levels of
trust and commitment. (Goo et
al., 2009)

Contracts and relational
governance function as
complements rather than as
substitutes. (Goo et al., 2009;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002)

Proper management of
the relationship is equally
or more important than the
basic contract
management (Fitzgerald &
Willcocks,1994)

Managers tend to employ greater
levels of relational norms as their
contracts become increasingly
customized. (Poppo and Zenger,
2002)

Disputes will be discussed
and resolved in a spirit of
partnership (Fitzgerald &
Willcocks,1994)
Classical and neoclassical
contract theory suffers from a
rigidness that does not take
into account the relational
aspect in contracts.(Kern,
1997)

Color Reference

SLAs may act as a substitute for
relational governance as these
characteristics were found to
dampen the level of trust and
commitment through moderation
effects (Goo et al., 2009)

Well structured SLAs play
an important role in
cultivating favorable
relationships. (Goo &
Huang, 2008)

Explaining the
relationship between
organizations from a
purely economic point
of view is unjustifiable.
(Szu-Yuan, Tung-Ching
et. al., 2002

Grouping of claims related to the importance of SLA's
More contract detail, shorter-term
contracts, and higher-dollar valued
contracts were positively related to ITO
success. (Lacity, 2009)

Grouping of claims related to contractual flexibility
Grouping of claims related to the complementary nature of contracts and relationships
Trust, mutual understanding and
commitment are strongly related to
outsourcing satisfaction. (Szu-Yuan,
Tung-Ching et. al., 2002

Represent combinations of two or more groupings

The client pulls the relationship toward a
hierarchy structure, wherein problems are
addressed through mutual adjustments. The
vendor, in contrast, pulls the relationship toward
a market structure, dictated by a priori
coordination structures and contracts.
(Sabherwal, 2003)

Shape Reference
Claim

Grounds

Warrant

Counter Claim

Qualifier

Figure 29 - Formal and Informal Control Map
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Satisfaction in the outsourcing
relationship will come about
naturally with the achievement
of the client's expectations
(Kern, 2000).

Expectations depend on
how the supplier reacts and
responds to demands and
changes made by the
client's end-users (Kern,
2000).

A key to successful relationship is to
maintain open communication at all
times. Do not communicate only
when there is a problem (Lynch,
2000)
Misalignment of
ambitions and
expectations is often
found to be the root
cause of problems (Kern,
2000; Vowler, 1996).

Contract-driven management
contributes to undermining the
trust and commitment of the
vendor (Natovich, 2003)

Each party may have a different
interpretation of whether
contractual obligations are met
(Natovich, 2003)
Contract-driven
control is flawed
(Natovich, 2003)

A successful relationship
is identifiable by the way
it handles conflict
situations. (Kern, 2000)
Longer-term contracts that
lack flexibility tend to
increase the likelihood of
dissatisfaction (Lynch,
2000)
.

However detailed the contract,
or favorable the terms, mot
contracts cannot anticipate the
changes in an evolving
environment (Lynch, 2000)

There is no quicker way to
sabotage a relationship
than to allow unpleasant
surprises (Lynch, 2000).

Frequent communication is likely to
lead to greater trust, and
contrastingly greater
trustworthiness can cause improved
formal and informal communication
(Kern 2000, Anderson and Narus,
1990; Dwyer et al., 1987).

Good communication
between participants
facilitate solutions to
problems and helps to
avoid conflicts (Kern
2000, Easton 1992)

Conflict Resolution is
important for
partnership
development

The level and nature of
interdependence between
organizations are likely to
influence the potential and
source for conflict. The higher
the interdependence, the
higher the risk for conflict and
harm (Kumar & van Dissel,
1996).

Bargaining is critical to
conflict resolution, which
is important for
partnership development
(Klepper, 1995).

Increased level of
interdependence between
organizations is likely to
increase the potential for conflict
by increasing the need for
coordination (Kumar & van
Dissel, 1996).

The level of structure (the level
of specification of roles,
obligations, rights, procedures,
information flows, and data) in
the relationship can influence
the potential for conflict. The
potential risk of conflict is
reduced with greater structure
(Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).

Outsourcing success
was not affected by
the degree of conflict
between the service
receiver and provider
(Lee and Kim, 1999).

Color Reference

Poor communication is
second only to poor
planning as a major
cause of outsourcing
relationship failure
(Lynch, 2000).

While disagreements
between vendor and
client are normal, they
can become dangerous
when the engagement
falls into a vicious cycle
(Natovich, 2003).

Lack of trust leads to a conflict that
yields poor performance, which in
turn damages the trust even more
and causes more conflicts, and so
on. At certain point the trust has
reached such low level that any
new conflict can put an end to an
entire project (Natovich, 2003).

Grouping of claims related to formal control
Vendors with whom the
client more easily and
successfully resolves
disputes through bargaining
are better potential partners
than vendors who are
difficult to deal with
(Klepper,1995)..

Grouping of claims related to communication.

Grouping of claims related to negotiation management

Cultural similarity
had no effect on
partnership
quality (Lee and
Kim, 1999).

Represent combinations of two or more groupings

Shape Reference
Claim

Grounds

Warrant

Counter Claim

Qualifier

Bargaining arises as part of
contract negotiations with every
project undertaken by a vendor
and often arises again when
unforeseen mid-project
circumstances require and
adjustment of requirements and
performance (Klepper, 1995).

Figure 30 - Conflict Resolution Map
!

146!

A degree of cultural
understanding, an element
of flexibility regarding the
contract, and a notion of fair
deal has to exist in
outsourcing relations
(Fitzgerald and Willcocks,
1994).

Problems in ventures tend to
arise when the parties involved
do not share the same social
and cultural traits and norms
(Kern, 2000).

APPENDIX F – EXAMPLE OF ARTICLE ANALYSIS
!
In order to properly describe the methodology used to develop the argument maps for IT
Outsourcing Governance, a step-by-step deconstruction of the arguments included in a paper is
shown in order to demonstrate how claims, grounds, warrants and other argument components are
identified. The article chosen for this purpose is “IT Outsourcing Success: A Psychological
Contract Perspective” (Koh et al., 2004). This particular article was chosen because it presents a
good example of a complete argument within a clear, well-defined topic.
Following the methodology depicted by Fletcher and Huff (1990a,b), the deconstruction
of the argument occurs in 4 stages.
•

First Pass: Read through the whole document, identifying topics, arguments, and the most
obvious key claims.

•

Second Pass: Mark all claims, and identify grounds for each claim.

•

Third Pass: Within each argument, identify sub claims, elaborations and reiterations.

•

Fourth Pass: Provide implicit warrants wherever they are not obvious.

First Pass
A comprehensive read of the document yields an obvious topic that is clearly stated in the
abstract and introduction. In addition, the main claim of the article is also clearly stated. Relevant
sections of the abstract and introduction are included below, with the main topic and claim in
underlined text.
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“The purpose of the current study is to present a new perspective on managing
outsourcing by focusing on both customers and suppliers through the unique lens of
psychological contracting. A psychological contract refers to an individual’s mental
beliefs about his or her mutual obligations in a contractual relationship (Rousseau 1995).
Psychological contract theory offers a highly relevant and sound theoretical lens for
studying IT outsourcing management because of its three distinctive principles: (1) its
focus on mutual (rather than one-sided) obligations between contractual par- ties, (2) its
emphasis on psychological (as distinct from legal) obligations, and (3) its emphasis on an
individual (rather than interorganizational) level of analysis (p. 357).”
After identifying the main topic of the article as described above, the main claim, or purpose of
the article was also identified.
“…successful IT outsourcing relies heavily on a psychological contract between the customer
and the supplier. These psychological con- tract obligations may be written into the terms of a
legal contract, or based simply on oral promises and other expressions of commitment made by
the parties (p. 358).”
One can observe that clear intent of the authors to advance the idea that psychological contracts
are important for the success of an IT outsourcing arrangement.
Second and Third Passes
The second and third passes are combined in this analysis in order to provide a more succinct
example. The emphasis of this stage is on the identification of grounds that support the claim that
psychological contracts are important to the success of a sourcing relationship. The grounds
offered to support the main claim are the results of studies performed by the authors. These
!
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results are mentioned in the abstract and are discussed in more detail in other sections of the
article.
“Qualitative analysis identified six major components of what customers believe are
supplier obligations in an outsourcing project. These were (1) accurate project scoping,
(2) clear authority structures, (3) taking charge, (4) effective human capital management,
(5) effective knowledge transfer, and (6) building effective interorganizational teams.
Similarly, six major components representing what suppliers believe are customer
obligations in an outsourcing project were determined to be (1) clear specifications, (2)
prompt payment, (3) close project monitoring, (4) dedicated project staffing, (5)
knowledge sharing, and (6) project ownership (p. 361).”
The previously mentioned grounds highlight the existence of elements that are considered to
comprise the psychological contract between customer and supplier. However, the existence of
these elements is not enough to convince the reader that they are important for a successful
outsourcing arrangement. In order to address this apparent shortcoming, the authors provide an
explicit warrant that serves as a logical bridge to justify the claim on the basis of the grounds
provided.
Fourth Pass
As stated by Fletcher and Huff (1990), the identification of warrants can be extremely
challenging, as most of the time writers do not include them explicitly in their arguments. The
purpose of the warrants is to show what the logical connection between the claims and the
grounds is. In most cases, this connection is obvious, and therefore warrants can be omitted.
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In the analysis of this article, the logical connection between grounds and claims is
provided by the statement of an explicit warrant as depicted below.
“…fulfilled obligations predict success over and above the effects of contract type,
duration, and size (p. 356).”
This warrant is reiterated in other sections of the article, making the connection between grounds
and claim even more explicit.
“Results from our study showed the existence of a psychological contract between
outsourcing customers and suppliers, and that fulfilling these obligations explained a
significant amount of the variance in out- sourcing success (p. 371).”
Once all the components of the argument were identified, the claims, grounds and warrants were
used in the development of the argument maps to graphically depict the different elements of the
arguments surrounding IT Outsourcing Governance.

!
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APPENDIX G – SAMPLE SCREEN SHOTS OF ORM TOOLS
!
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Figure 31 - Hiperos Dashboard
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Figure 32 - Hiperos Supplier Management
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Figure 33 - Enlighta Incident Management
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